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MAKING WAR WITHOUT A DECLARATION
J. Terry Emerson*
INTRODUCTION
The history of the war powers under the Constitution is as old as the
Republic and as current as today's headlines. It is a story that may surprise
many readers. For no provision of the Constitution expressly states that "the
President shall conduct foreign policy," nor does it contain the words "Congress
shall make war." Indeed the Framers changed the clause to substitute the word
"make" with "declare."'
The difference between these two terms may have opened the constitutional
gateway to the conduct of over 200 Presidential wars2 - instances in which
presidents have committed U.S. military forces to combat outside the country or
into situations where the threat of hostile armed action involving U.S. units was
imminent - all without a congressional declaration of war. Vietnam is an obvious
example of actual armed hostilities and loss of life on a massive scale. Congress
had passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution3 and voted military appropriations 4 but
it had never voted a declaration of war. The Gulf Resolution had even been
repealed before all American troops left Indochina.'
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is an example of a president risking an
even greater conflagration, a near nuclear holocaust, without any actual exchange
* At the time of writing, J. Terry Emerson was Lawyer in Residence at Frances Lewis Law
Center, Washington and Lee University. Mr. Emerson has also served as Legal Counsel to U.S.
Senator Barry Goldwater.
1. 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 313, (M. Farrand ed. 1966 ) (rev. ed.
1937). The full range of current opinion concerning the War Powers can be found in Hearings on
War Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
E. KEYNEs, UNDECLARED WAR (1982); A. ScHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERiAL PRESIDENCY (1973); A.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIs AND CONSTrrUTIONAL PowER: Tim Ouonis (1976); Emerson, The
War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAmE LAW.
187 (1975); and Goldwater, The President's Ability to Protect America's Freedoms- The Warmaking
Power, Law & Social Order, 3 ARIz. ST. L.J. 423 (1971).
2. See Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 53, 88-110 app. A (1972). See
also Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., 126-148 (1973) [hereinafter War Powers Hearings]. A more recent list has been compiled
by The Library of Congress. See CoNG. REs. Smv. Rep. No. 83-204F, Instances of Use of United
States Armed Forces Abroad 1798-1983, (E. Collier ed. Nov. 4, 1983).
3. The so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution is the popular name for Southeast Asia Resolution,
Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
4. Congressional funding for the entire period of the U.S. military engagement in Vietnam is
documented in Emerson, Congress and the Commitment to Vietnam, CONoREsS, TH PRESIDENT,
AND FOREIGN POLICY 57-74, 1984 A.B.A. STANDING Comm. ON LAW AND NAT'L SECURITY.
5. See supra note 3. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was repealed in the 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1971) by Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971).
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of weapons fire. 6 No declaration of war supported President John F. Kennedy's
180 ship naval blockade of Cuba, with its associated military alert and general
mobilization, lasting from October 24 to December 6, 1962. 7 More recent unilat-
eral Presidential military actions have included the stationing of 1,200 Marines
(Lebanon in 1982 and 1983),8 an invasion of Grenada (1983), 9 bombing strikes
on military installations in Libya (1986),10 and attacks by U.S. war ships and
helicopters on Iranian gunboats and mining installations in the Persian Gulf
(1987 and 1988)." Raising memories of Franklin Roosevelt's naval escort of
British supply convoys across the Atlantic in 1941 before a U.S. declaration of
war,' 2 the U.S. Navy reportedly escorted 54 convoys, comprising 157 ships,
through the Persian Gulf between July 22, 1987, and August 9, 1988, in the
midst of all-out war between Iran and Iraq.' 3 Then, late in 1989, President
George Bush twice ordered U.S. military interventions abroad: first, in support
of the democratically elected government of President Corazon Aquino in the
Philippines; and second, in deposing Panamanian General Manuel Noriega and
assisting the country's legal civilian authorities whose election Noriega had
nullified.14 President Bush continued his bold initiatives in 1990 by ordering the
evacuation by Marines of U.S. citizens endangered in Liberia, and committing
the largest U.S. force since Vietnam to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf after
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait."
These and other military actions evoke much controversy and numerous
questions. Is war without a declaration contemplated by the Constitution? What
constitutional checks exist to control or hold accountable independent Executive
war-making, if not the Declaration Clause? Can Congress by statute restrict in
advance the situations in which U.S. military force can be deployed or engaged
6. According to one of the participants, the Cuban Missile Crisis "brought the world to the
abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind." R. KENNEDY, THRmTEEN DAYS: A MEMOiR OF
THE CuBAN MssnmE CRs 23 (1969). On October 27, 1963, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane
was hit by a SAM missile and crashed in Cuba, killing the pilot. President Kennedy, however, did
not order retaliation against the SAM sites. Id. at 97-98.
7. See War Powers Hearings, supra note 2, at 146.
8. See HousE Comm. ON FORmoN AFFA Rs, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., CONGRESS AND FOREi N
POLICY 1982 51-54 (Comm. Print 1983). In late 1983, Congress enacted the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 6, 97 Stat. 805, 807, approved Oct. 12, 1983, authorizing
troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months.
9. See C. WEINRERGER, FIGHTINo FOR PEACE 101-188 (1990); J. MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA
MISSION (1984).
10. D. Hall, The Constitution and Presidential War Making Against Libya, XLII NAvAL WAR
C. REv., at 30, 33 (Summer 1989).
11. Mark, Persian Gulf and the War Powers Debate: Review of Events, CONo. REs. SERV. 5,
9-11, CRS Issue Brief (rev. Feb. 6, 1989).
12. "Roosevelt was in effect declaring Naval war on Germany... ." J. BuRNs, ROOSEVELT: THE
SOLDIR OF FREEDOM 141 (1970).
13. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1988, at AS, col. 6, cited in Mark, supra note 11, at 3.
14. In December 1989, President George Bush directed U.S. combat air patrol cover for defense
of the government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino. No shots were fired by U.S. aircraft.
Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 3, A30, col. 1. The Panama military operation was
reported in depth in Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, A31-38.
15. Americans Evacuated From Liberia, Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1, A17,
col. 4. According to a State Department spokesman, a force of more than 230 Marines flew 125
Americans, their dependents and other persons out of Liberia. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, at A7,
col. 1. Within 15 days after Iraq occupied Kuwait, President Bush had "put in motion the most
rapid military buildup in American history." N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1990, at 10, col. 5, 6.
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in hostilities? Can its "power of the purse" be exercised to tell the President
and military commanders where and how long armed forces can be stationed,
how many army divisions or naval battle groups can be deployed, and what
bases or areas those armed forces should defend? Can the legislature by a
declaration of war compel the President against his will to order an attack on
another nation when the President is convinced the attack would be disastrous
for the nation? And, in terms of the world's current crisis, could the President,
without legislative approval, invade Kuwait to expel occupying Iraq forces?
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
The case for Congress was succinctly put by Henry Clay in his speech on
the Mexican War at Lexington, Kentucky, on November 13, 1847, when he was
71 years old. Be it "Resolved," he said:
That by the Constitution of the United States, Congress, being invested with
power to declare war, and grant letters of marque and reprisal, to make rules
concerning captures on land and water, to raise and support armies, to provide
and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government of the land and
naval forces, has the full and complete war-making power of the United States;
and, so possessing it, has a right to determine upon the motives, cause, and
objects of any war, when it commences, or at any time during the progress of
its existence. 16
Clay was outraged at President James K. Polk for the manner in which,
Clay believed, Polk had precipitated the Mexican War on his own responsibility.
7
Months before the Declaration of War of May 13, 1846, Polk had ordered
General Winfield Scott to occupy disputed territory in Mexico. 8 Thus, Clay
believed Congress possessed authority, even after it had voted a declaration of
war, to supplement that declaration with a later "authentic act" guiding the
President as to the "purposes and objects" for which "the existing war ought
to be further prosecuted."' 9 Moreover, Clay proposed, "it is the duty of the
President in his official conduct to conform to such a declaration of Con-
gress.... "2 Should the President fail to conform, "it would become the right
and duty of Congress to adopt the most efficacious measures to arrest the further
progress of the war, taking care to make ample provision for the honor, the
safety and the security of our armies .... ,,21
Daniel Webster agreed that if the President waged a declared war for objects
exceeding the will of the legislature "then Congress ought to pass resolutions
against the prosecution of the war, and grant no further supplies.'"' John C.
16. C. COLTON, Tm LAST SEVEN YEARS OF THE Ln'a OF HENRY CLAY 68 (New York 1856)
(emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 69.
18. Act of May 13, 1846, 9 Stat. 9 (1846); CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 2, at 4.
19. See C. COLTON, supra note 16, at 68.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. M. PETERSON, THE GREAT TrumviRATE 431 (1987). Webster said at the Massachusetts Whig
Convention on September 29, 1847, that if Congress "is to have no voice in the declaration or
continuance of war, if it is not to judge of the propriety of beginning or carrying it on, - then we
depart at once, and broadly, from the Constitution." 13 THE WstrmNos A" SPEECHES OF DANIL
WEBSTER 364 (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass. 1903).
1990)
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Calhoun, the third member of the "Great Triumvirate," had already made his
opinion known regarding the war powers by abstaining on the congressional
declaration of war. In the words of historian Merrill D. Peterson, Calhoun argued
that President Polk's action, "forcing a declaration of war on Congress without
deliberation or reflection, effectively divested that body of the war-making
power.' 23
Abraham Lincoln, a first term congressman, added his opinion to these
eminent voices in February 1848, just days after the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo24 had ended the Mexican War:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem
it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may
choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose-and you allow him to
make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this
respect, after you have given him so much as you propose.Y
Lincoln then stated his view of the constitutional issue:
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress,
was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been
involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not
always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention
understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved
to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing
this oppression upon us.26
What, then, is the answer to the concerns of Clay, Webster, Calhoun and
Lincoln, predecessors of those legislators who enacted the War Powers Resolution 27
as an effort to limit future presidential wars? The answer lies in the text of the
Constitution, the intent of the Framers, two hundred years of U.S. history,
scattered judicial decisions, the great weight of scholarly opinion until the 1970s,
and the imperatives of sound public policy. In other words, the "Great Trium-
virate," in this instance at least, lacked the vision of a President Polk. His long-
range actions and goals for the nation were ratified by the subsequent approval
of a majority of Congress and the country. 28 Lincoln himself reversed his opinion
when faced with the vicissitudes of higher office and the rebellion of eleven
23. M. PETERSON, supra note 22, at 422. Calhoun objected to the preamble to the declaration
of war which stated that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists .. " 9 Stat.
9. Calhoun believed war could not exist until it was declared by Congress. 15 CONG. GLOBE 802,
804, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. (1846). In 1862, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that the battles of Palo
Alto and Resaca de la Palma had been fought before passage of the 1846 declaration of war. Justice
Grier wrote that the 1846 legislation "not only provided for the future prosecution of the war, but
was itself a vindication and ratification of the Act [sic] of the President in accepting the challenge
without a previous formal declaration of war by Congress." Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862).
Justice Grier thus refuted Calhoun's objection.
24. Treaty of Peace, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico (ratified March 16, 1848). See also 9
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF TH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 791 (C. Bevans,
ed. 1972).
25. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to W. H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 451-452 (emphasis in original).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555-559 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973)).
28. President Polk was "a man of clear views and gritty determination. Measured by its results,
no four-year presidency in American history so fully realized its goals." M. PETERSON, supra note
22, at 418.
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Southern States. In 1863, he wrote: "When rebellion or invasion comes, the
decision is to be made." The Commander-in-Chief "is the man who holds the
power and bears the responsibility of making it. "29 Later presidents, from Wilson
in Vera Cruz, Mexico, and Archangel, Russia,30 and Coolidge in Nicaragua,3 to
Eisenhower in Lebanon,3 2 and Ford in Cambodia,33 to mention a few, directed
the national force in the interest of saving the lives and freedoms of American
citizens, or for strategic purposes to that end, without waiting for a signal from
Congress. Whatever Clay, Webster, and Calhoun may have thought, their opinion
did not prevail then,3 nor does it prevail today in the much more dangerous
times of global terrorism, chemical gas warfare and nuclear tipped missiles.
Textual Powers of the President and Congress
The President's claim to direction of the war powers for national defense
arises out of authorities given in several provisions of the Constitution. First, the
President is vested with all of the national government's "executive Power."
3
1
The Executive can reasonably claim that this is not a passive grant, but includes
the traditional power held by a chief-of-state to protect the national safety, a
prerogative firmly recognized in the law of nations known to the Framers. Former
Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold has made this argument.3 6 For example, an
edition of The Law of Nations, circulated among leaders of the American
Revolution by Benjamin Franklin,3 7 states the rule that the Executive ought "to
watch for the nation, and take care to preserve it . . . and to secure it, as far
as possible, against everything that threatens its safety or its happiness. Hence
all the rights which a nation derives from its obligation to preserve and protect
itself . . . reside in the [Executive].' '
3
Second, the President is the primary diplomatic officer of the nation by
virtue of the conjunction of the "executive Power ' 3 9 and his exclusive power to
29. See A. SCHLESINGER JR., supra note 1, at 72. In 1864, Lincoln wrote of his actions as
President: "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming
indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation." Letter
from Abraham Lincoln to A. G. Hodges (April 4, 1864) in ABRAHAM LINcoLN: MYSTIC CHORDS OF
MEMORY (Larry Shapiro ed. 1984).
30. War Powers Hearings, supra note 2, at 140.
31. Id. at 142.
32. Id. at 145.
33. The Mayaguez incident of May 1975 is fully discussed in 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1975, at
310-311 (1976) [hereinafter CQ ALMANAC 1975].
34. A House of Representatives resolution demanding the withdrawal of American troops to the
east bank of the Rio Grande was defeated by a vote of 137-41. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess.,
93, 94 (1848). A similar resolution calling for the withdrawal of American forces from Mexico to a
"defensive line" was tabled. Id. at 179.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
36. See statement of then Solicitor General Griswold reprinted in 117 CONG. Rac. 28,976-28,978
(1971).
37. The copies of THE LAW OF NATIONS that Franklin sent to the Continental Congress and
leading citizens of the Colonies were apparently based on the 1775 Amsterdam edition he had received
from Frederic Dumas. 22 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANxLIN 48, 287, 389-390, 569, 635 (W. Willcox
ed. 1982).
38. E. DE VATrEL, Tn LAW OF NATIONS 14 (Amsterdam rev. ed. 1758) (reprint 1982). See also
C. VON WOLFF, 2 Tn LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDINO TO A SCIENTIFIC METHOD 26, § 39
(n.p. ed. 1764) (reprint 1934).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
19901
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"receive Ambassadors. '"40 In this role, he possesses and exercises, as Justice
Potter Stewart cast it, "a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of
foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense.
' 4'
Third, the Constitution designates the President as "Commander in Chief." '42
This title has been defined by a leading authority as encompassing "the conduct
of all military operations in time of peace and of war, thus embracing control
of the disposition of troops, the direction of vessels of war and the planning
and execution of campaigns . . . . "41 In addition, the Commander in Chief power
has been historically recognized as a functional base for the President's authority.
His right to use military force "in such manner as, in his judgment, the public
good . . . might require" was openly debated and accepted by the Congress as
early as 1798."
Fourth, the President is vested with the duty and right to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." 45 The Supreme Court has construed this
responsibility to include enforcement not only of statutes and treaties, but also
of "the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the
government under the Constitution. '"4
Fifth, the President may view his oath of office, to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States, ' 47 as both reinforcing the executive
power found elsewhere in the Constitution and as a source of power in itself.
"A Constitution which does not permit the Commander in Chief to order
belligerent acts whenever they are deemed necessary to defend the interests of
the nation, would be less an instrument intended to endure through the ages,
than a suicide pact."
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
41. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
J. Stewart added this thoughtful summary of executive defense powers:
For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a President of the United States possesses
vastly greater constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power than does,
say, a prime minister of a country with a parliamentary form of government.
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our
national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas
of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an
informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of
democratic government.
Id. at 727-728.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
43. Wright, Validity of the Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20 COLUM. L. Rav. 121,
134 (1920). See also holding of Court of Claims: "In time of war, the Commander in Chief has the
same powers as other civilized governments, and the exercise of them need no ratification to give
them effective force." Warner, Barnes.& Co. v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 1, 32 (1904) (relating to
the undeclared war in the Philippines).
44. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1269, 1410, 1445-1446, 1451, 1454-1455, 1457-1459, 1462, 1477, 1521
(1851).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
46. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1889).
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. But the President is under no duty to carry out an
unconstitutional law, as the author believes the War Powers Resolution to be.
48. B. ScHWARTz, 2 Tim POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 205 (1963). In his gifted and stimulating
study of the war-making power, M. GLENNON, CoNs~rrtroNAL DIPLOMACY, (1990), Professor Glen-
non, a former legislative and legal counsel in the U.S. Senate, builds the thesis that there are areas
where the President can initiate military defensive action in the face of legislative silence, but can
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Matched against the war powers vested in the President is an array of
enumerated powers conferred upon Congress, including the powers to declare
war, issue letters of marque and reprisal, raise and support the army and provide
and maintain a navy, make rules for the regulation of those forces, provide for
calling forth the militia, define and punish piracies and offenses against the law
of nations (terrorism), and control the national purse. In particular, the Decla-
ration Clause has been raised as the conclusive, debate-ending rejoinder to
Executive assertions of national defense powers.
This contest leads into an examination of what the Framers contemplated
and how they distinguished the war powers of Congress from those of the
President. It is my thesis that the Framers intended to leave with the President
sufficient discretion and flexibility to determine in what circumstances force is
necessary as an instrument of national policy to protect U.S. citizens, territory
and freedoms. The checks and balances and separation of powers do apply, but
they operate at their weakest, at least in the early stages of an emergency.
Declaration of War
The idea that a declaration of war is a prerequisite for the waging of war
is a myth. Actually, the power to declare war was viewed as one of the least
important war powers by political figures of the 18th Century. According to the
contemporary meaning and usage given to the instrument, it served as an official
proclamation of solemn, public war or as an initial step of commencing "offen-
sive" war. By comparison, the power of the purse and the ability of limiting the
supplies and size of the land and naval forces were by far the major means of
controlling involvement in hostilities. A military campaign was either funded or
it was not. To read the Declaration Clause to mean that no defensive military
action can be commenced without a specific policy authorization of Congress is
to confer a meaning which appears nowhere in the Constitution and to give it a
purpose which the Framers never intended.
The vast majority of wars are begun without any declaration. This was as
true in the Framers' day as it is today. In the eighty-seven years of the 18th
Century preceding the Constitutional Convention, thirty-eight wars were waged
in the western world. Only one of them was begun by a declaration.4 9 That the
Framers knew of this fact is proven by Hamilton's statement in the Federalist
continue such independent action only until Congress acts. In Glennon's model, true plenary
Presidential powers, such as choosing the site of a landing operation, are few and far outnumbered
by concurrent congressional authorities. Where the war powers are concurrent, Glennon argues,
Congress is ultimately supreme whenever its policy conflicts with Presidential decisions.
As discussed in the text, my disagreement with Glennon's thesis is founded on multifold
considerations: (i) the structural concept that a legislative body of numerous members is simply not
organized in a way to direct the use of force (a fact well understood by the Framers); (ii) the value
of subsequent usage as setting the meaning of the Constitution in this area; (iii) the historical truth
that a "declaration of war" is a meaningless fossil today and held only a limited purpose in the late
18th Century; (iv) a concern that Glennon's model is really an argument for legislative supremacy
which would make the grants of power to the President functionless; (v) a belief that Glennon
misperceives the true nature and extent of Presidential war powers which are bestowed by the
Constitution beyond the Commander in Chief provision; and (vi) a conviction that the Framers
believed the consequence of tying the President's hands in defense of the people or nation can be
disaster or national suicide.
49. J. MAURICE, HosTm.rrss WrrIHoUT A DECLARATION OF WAR 12-27 (1883).
1990]
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No. 25, that declarations of war were already in disuse in his age.50 The Framers
did give a meaning to the Declaration Clause, but it was essentially concerned
with "offensive" war, wars of conquest, jealousy and rivalry."' For example,
Hamilton, in the second essay of Pacificus, explained that by assisting France in
1793 instead of remaining neutral, the United States would have engaged in an
offensive war, since France was then a belligerent nation in Europe.12 By the law
of nations, as compiled by the authorities of their time, the Framers knew that
a declaration was not required for defensive war. 5" Of course, the Framers meant
to limit presidents from engaging in wars of aggression, ambition and conquest,
but they also knew from experience that a nation must attend to its own survival
and that as a consequence, this nation needed a single authority which would
provide unity of action for the defense of the country.
We know from the records preserved by Washington and Madison that the
Framers voted "to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.'"' In so doing, the Framers
acknowledged the fact that the United States might be attacked without the
formality of a prior declaration, and that defensive measures might be required
without any declaration. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language
- used by informed Americans at the time of the Constitutional Convention -
defines "declare" as "to make known" or "to proclaim," and the term "to
make" meant "to create" or "to bring into any state or condition.""5
Many in the current Congress would reverse these meanings. Yet, if any
concessions are to be made to contemporary notions, the principle should uphold
greater Presidential discretion. In the technologically advanced, economically
interrelated society of the late twentieth century, with cataclysmic weapons of
50. "[T]he ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse. THE
FEDERAIST No. 25, at 165 (A. Hamilton) (1961).
51. The "usual contests of Empire and Ambition," with which the Framers were familiar, were
"waged by a ruling prince to extend his dominions, or settle a dynastic squabble, or secure a
commercial advantage." D. HicwimorT.m, THE WAR OF AmERICAN INDEPENDENCE 103 (1971). See
also the letter by President Washington to his Cabinet, April 18, 1793, including two questions
addressed to the distinctions between "offensive" and "defensive" war. J. MARsHAL, 5 THE LIFE
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 329 (1806 ed. reprint 1969). In Dellums v. Bush, No. 90-2866 (D.D.C. Nov.
20, 1990), forty-five Congressmen filed suit to enjoin the Executive from initiating an "offensive
military attack" against the military forces of Iraq without a declaration of war. :Contrary to the
premise of the suit, collective defense to expel an invader, rescue hostages or otherwise confront
aggression initiated by another is not "offensive war."
52. 7 WORKS OF HAMILTON 86-87, 88-93 (J. Hamilton ed. 1851). Hamilton also discusses the
differences between "offensive war" and "guarding the community against the ambition or enmity
of other nations" in THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 208 (A. Hamilton).
53. "He who is attacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to make any hos-
tile declaration. ... E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 293, 316 (Amsterdam rev. ed. 1775)
(reprint 1982). See also C. VON WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 368 (n.p. ed. 1764) (reprint 1934). Grotius, the father of international
jurisprudence, wrote that: "To repel force, or to punish a delinquent, the law of nature requires
no declaration." Grotius believed, however, that after such a "defensive war" had commenced,
a public declaration would "give it the character of a national and lawful war . . ." under the
voluntary law of nations. H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHT OF WAR AND PEACE 317, 322 (n.p. ed. 1646)
(reprint 1979).
54. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)
(Madison's Notes).
55. S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (n.p. ed. 1755) (reprint 1979).
[Vol. 17:23
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war and almost instant means of their delivery, the power "to repel sudden
attacks," which is conceded by all sides, must be interpreted to allow the President
to meet serious foreign dangers before they become insurmountable. For example,
Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Special Subcommittee on War Powers,
said "I think it is emergency, versus policy, that provides the President with
constitutional authority to initiate use of force.' '56 With this concession, the door
is open to the use of force in whatever situation the President judges to be an
emergency. The test of the President's authority has to be the degree of the
emergency - whether the risk to U.S. security is as grave and threatening in
current circumstances as was the kind of "sudden attack" which was perceived
in 1787.
Another power mistakenly relied upon by spokespersons for congressional
supremacy over the war powers is the "Necessary and Proper Clause" of Article
I.17 This provision cannot serve as a guise for congressional measures stripping
the Executive of its vested functions. To the contrary, William Whiting, special-
counselor of the War Department in 1862 and its solicitor from 1863 to 1865,58
advised President Lincoln that Congress is "bound to pass such laws as will aid
[the President]" in carrying into execution his military powers.19 The correct
principle is this: congressional actions under the "Necessary and Proper Clause"
must be in aid of the functions of the President as Commander in Chief; they
cannot restrict his exercise of those functions.60 This construction of the Consti-
tution is supported by Myers v. United States, 6 in which the Supreme Court
held that Congress could not limit the President's discretion of removal of
Executive officers even though Congress itself had created those offices. Chief
Justice Taft, writing for the Court, emphasized that Congress cannot vary the
exercise of the President's powers. This, he said, "would be a delegation by the
[Constitutional] Convention to Congress of the function of defining the primary
boundaries of another of the three great divisions of government." 62 The Court
also took a restrictive view of the "Necessary and Proper Clause" in Kinsella v.
Singleton.63 It held that the clause "is not a grant of power," but merely removes
56. Hearings on The War Powers After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional
Impasse Before the Special Subcomm. on War Powers of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1988) [hereinafter War Powers After 200 Years].
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Senator Adams has suggested that Congress's power "[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 14, supports legislative limitations on the President's deployment of military force. War
Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 34. But this provision relates to an entirely different
function; namely, court-martial jurisdiction. Its origin rests in the practice of Parliament to govern
military justice. J. STOREY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON TaE CoNsTrrtToN oF THE UNITED STATES § 1197,
110-111 (Massachusetts 1858). The provision enables Congress to enact the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1950)), not to set military policy directives or "impair the authority of
the President as Commander in Chief." Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221, aff'd, 165
U.S. 553 (1897).
58. 21 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 703 (H. Starr ed. 1944).
59. W. WHITING, THn WAR POWERS OF Tm PRESIDENT AND TH LEGISLATVE POWERS OF CONGRESS
IN RELATION TO REBELLION, TREASON, AND SLAVERY 33 (n.p. 10th ed. 1864) (reprint 1971).
60. J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO TE CONSTImT ONAL LAW OF 1ma UNITED STATES 289
(1875).
61. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
62. Id. at 127.
63. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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the uncertainty that Congress may implement the powers otherwise vested by the
Constitution."
Power of the Purse
Congress cannot use its power of appropriations to legislate policy restrictions
over the conduct of the President's defense powers. Nevertheless, Congress has
great powers over military affairs. It controls the size and the strength of the
armed forces and the quantity and quality of weapons which are available for
waging war. Congress can provide, or refuse to provide, a multitude of emergency
powers involving foreign trade and the control of strategic materials. 61 The
legislature can approve or reject treaties or other legislative measures, such as
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, having defense implications.6 Ultimately, as will be
discussed below, the impeachment power is available if a President should commit
an irresponsible abuse of a constitutional discretion. But once Congress has
decided how many personnel should be enlisted or what arms should be procured,
the President may station those troops and position those weapons in such parts
of the world as he determines essential to the national defense, in agreement
with other friendly governments, without any geographical or time limitations
imposed by Congress.
The truth of this proposition can be seen by posing a few specific examples.
One was suggested by retired Judge Robert Bork, who argued as follows:
Once Congress provides the President with armed forces, it cannot interfere with
his tactical decisions, and, considering that the deployment of men and material
is often crucial to the conduct of foreign policy, in the modern world "tactical
decisions" may encompass a great deal.... [S]urely it is not debatable that
Congress's constitutional power would not extend to dictating the site for the
invasion of Europe or to ordering that no funds be expended in the defense of
Bastogne since it was better that the troops there should surrender.6
Another quandary is presented by two intelligence specialists in their contri-
bution to an important recent study, The Fettered Presidency:
It does not follow, however, that in return for appropriating funds for a given
purpose, ... Congress is entitled to impose any condition it wishes on how the
funds are spent .... Thus, although Congress may appropriate funds to support
an army or not, as it sees fit, it cannot make its appropriation conditional on
the President's acquiescing to someone other than himself becoming commander
in chiefA'
Former President Gerald Ford added another limit to the congressional
appropriations power in his 1989 testimony on war powers before a special
subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said:
64. Id. at 247.
65. In 1969, fully 284 national emergency laws were in effect. OmcE OF EMERGENCY PREPAR-
EDNESS, ExEcUTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS CONFERRED BY LAWS
NEFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1969 (1969).
66. Approximately 52 of the unilateral Presidential military actions identified are plausibly based
on authority conferred by various treaties. See Appendix G, reprinted in War Powers Hearings,
supra note 2, at 117-119. Section 8 of the War Powers Resolution (Pub. L. No. 93-148), however,
provides that no such authority for the use of troops is to be raised from treaties.
67. Bork, Foreword to G. SCHMTrT & A. SmnLsKY, Tim FETTERED PRESIDENCY xiii, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INsTrrUTE FOR PUBUC POLiCY RESEARCH (1989).
68. Id. ch. 5, at 73.
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I do not think Congress can use the power of the purse to tell a President that
he has to use this weapon system or that weapon system in the actual undertaking
of the national defense of the United States . . . [T]o try and minimanage the
use of weapons in a war or vessels in a war, I think, is going too far.-
In other words, Congress cannot use a funding measure as a tool for
invading the area of discretion that is constitutionally vested with the President,
just as it cannot employ the appropriations power to violate the due process of
a citizen.7 0 It is circular reasoning to assert that it is legal to use the appropriations
power to restrict the President's role as Commander in Chief because appropri-
ations must be "made by Law." Appropriations are one thing; a prohibition on
the President's independent defense authority is another. It begs the question of
whether Congress can interfere with such an independent function of another
department by justifying such interference on the basis of the appropriations
function. The true question is whether Congress can invade the separation of
powers by attempting to increase its own power at the expense of the executive
branch. 7' Can Congress tell the President, for example, that he cannot commit
military force to protect U.S. shipping in international waters, such as the Persian
Gulf, or that he cannot defend vital U.S. interests beyond an arbitrary time
period, such as the sixty days permitted by the War Powers Resolution? My
conclusion is that such a prohibition, even if attached to an appropriations bill,
invalidly diminishes the President's executive power. Further, it would give
Congress, by inaction (within sixty days of a hostility), an automatic veto upon
executive branch action in violation of the 1983 decision in Chadha which held
that such a legislative veto is unconstitutional. 72
69. See War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 173-174.
70. Congress cannot do what would otherwise be unconstitutional by attaching a rider to an
appropriations law. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). In overruling the "Armstrong
Amendment" to the Fiscal Year 1989 District of Columbia Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No. 100-
462, approved Oct. 1, 1988), U.S. District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth held that "Congress'
plenary power is still bounded by the Bill of Rights .. " Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp.
605, 613 (D.D.C. 1988). Two plenary powers of Congress were involved, appropriations and Congress'
authority "Itlo exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" over the District of Columbia.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
71. By attempting to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch, congressional
policy riders are distinguished from the special prosecutor law upheld in Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988). Instead, they can be categorized similar to the legislative veto in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and the deficit reduction in Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986). In both cases, the United States Supreme Court found a danger of
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions. Of course, the Federal Judiciary is likely to
find in the future, as it has in the past, that issues requiring the exercise of expertise regarding the
prosecution of national objectives through military means or national defense strategy are outside
judicial competence. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.C. 1987); appeal dismissed
(D.C. Cir. 1988), mandate issued Feb 16, 1989, (Civ. A. No. 87-5426)(per curiam)(Persian Gulf);
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(aid to Nicaraguan rebels); Crockett v.
Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(U.S. presence in El Salvador); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d
122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(use of national defense reserve fleet); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974)(Cambodian bombing); and Ange v.
Bush, No. 90-2792 (D.D.C. 1990)(Operation Desert Shield). But c.f. Dellums v. Bush, No. 90-2866
(D.D.C. 1990)(Desert Shield). A recent study of court review of war measures finds that "almost
without exception, Federal judges have been unwilling to intercede during periods of national
emergency."C. MAY, IN THE NAae OF WAR: JuDIcIAL REVEw AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918,
at 260 (1989).
72. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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At the time of the Constitutional Convention the power of the purse was
an extremely powerful check on making war, but in a different way. In the early
years of the nation, it was possible to conceive of no navy and virtually no army
at all. In fact, President Washington had a regular army of only 672 men
available in 1789, 1,216 in 1790, and 2,128 in 1791. 71 Congress could put an
entire clamp on war by the simple step of not raising forces or of reducing
supplies. The method in which this technique could be achieved is illustrated in
a law passed by the Third Congress. The Navy under the Constitution began
with the Act of March 27, 1794, which authorized a small naval force for
protection of trade of the United States against "Algerine" cruisers. Section nine
provided that "if a peace shall take place between the United States and the
Regency of Algiers, that no farther [sic] proceeding be had under this act." '74
Thus, there would be no navy, except for this one emergency.
Similarly, an amendment proposed in 1794 by Congressman Sedgwick to a
bill providing for the raising of auxiliary troops would have required that the
force be completely disbanded if no war should break out with any European
power within two years, and six months after the time of their enlistment.
Although the amendment did not pass, it reflects the understanding of our
forefathers as to how war was to be controlled. 75 Congress did not pass policy
rules seeking to restrict the President's discretion as to when or where the military
forces provided by law were to be deployed. Congress disbanded or reduced the
size of those forces if it wanted to restrain the President. When any effort was
made to control the President's flexibility, it was defeated on every occasion
during Washington's two terms76 and on virtually every other time, with the
exception of the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, 77 until the 1970s. If the option of
73. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2073 (1797); R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMy 89
(1967). The maximum strength of the Regular Army under Washington's Administration was about
4,111 officers and rank and file, reached in 1793. Federalized state militia supplemented the regulars
during the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania in 1794. Letter from Maurice Matloff, Chief
Historian, Department of the Army, Center of Military History, to Senator Barry Goldwater (Sept.
19, 1975).
74. "An Act to provide a Naval Armament," 1 Stat. 350, 351 § 9. Only three of the six ships
authorized in the 1794 law were completed during Washington's Presidency and these were not
launched until after he had retired from office. C. PAULLIN, HISTORY OF NAVAL ADMINISTRATION 91,
97 (1968).
75. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 500-504 (1794).
76. Id. at 1221.
77. The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 sought to keep the United States out of
war in Europe. Certain provisions of the 1939 statute are still in effect. 22 U.S.C. § 441-457 (1939).
As to the defeat of earlier troop removal efforts, in 1912 Senator Bacon proposed an amendment to
the Army Appropriation Bill which would have prohibited U.S. troops from being "employed,
stationed, or on duty" outside the United States or its possessions. It was defeated without a record
vote. 48 CoNo. REc. 10,927-10,930 (1912). In 1919, several Members of Congress introduced legislation
seeking to bring U.S. soldiers home from Europe and Siberia. The only one that passed was a
nonbinding request for information on the Siberian Expedition. 58 CONG. REc. 1864 (1919). In 1922
a heated debate took place over a proposed restriction on funds used, "except in time of emergency,"
for more than specified numbers of personnel on the Continent of Europe, in the Panama Canal
Zone or in the Hawaiian Islands. The House of Representatives voted to strike the provision which
had been reported by the Committee on Appropriations. 62 CoNG. REc. 4109-4110, 4295-4298 (1922).
A similar limitation applicable to Marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic was rejected by the
Senate in December 1922. 64 CoNG. REc. 1131 (1922). In 1925 the Senate defeated a prohibition on
Marines in Haiti. 66 CONG. REc. 2191 (1925). Then, in 1928, two Senate Amendments were defeated;
one to prevent American forces from being used for intervention abroad "unless war has been
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limiting the size of the forces or curtailing supplies is no longer viable in the
opinion of those who want stronger control over presidential discretion, the way
to address the situation is by constitutional amendment, not by reading into the
Constitution powers for Congress which the Framers never contemplated.
Commander in Chief
Imagine yourself in a country where your worst enemy occupies military
bases inside your territory and is inciting ethnic peoples to attack small towns
along your borders. Imagine, too, that another foreign power is blockading one
of your major trade routes to international waters. It is also occupying land that
closes off a part of your nation from valuable warm water ports. To make
matters worse, one of your few allies is trying to get you involved in its own
quarrels with other powers stronger than you. What is more, serious civil
rebellions have erupted in the last year within two constituent parts of your
nation. Imagine all this and you can picture exactly the situation of the United
States in 1787. Is it any wonder that in these circumstances the Framers were
concerned with vesting the nation's defense powers with an energetic and decisive
Commander in Chief?
Although forgotten today, at the moment of the Constitutional Convention
the country faced foreign threats from every direction. To the north, Britain
illegally held onto frontier military posts it had agreed to cede in the Peace
Treaty of 1783. Britain excluded us from the Saint Lawrence River and fomented
Indian raiding attacks across our northern frontier. To the south, Spain possessed
New Orleans and posts at the mouth of the Mississippi River and in the Floridas.
In the years immediately preceding the Convention, Spain blocked the free
navigation of American boats on the Mississippi, imposed special tariffs for the
deposit of goods in New Orleans, and plotted creation of an Indian buffer state
between Spanish possessions and the' American border. Even our erstwhile ally,
France, was suspected by Secretary of State Jefferson of attempting to make the
United States a dependent client embroiled in France's foreign conflicts.78 Added
to these threats was an awareness by the Framers that the "extension of our
own commerce in our own vessels" as distant as "the trade to China and India"
would invite hostility against our fleets and require "the best possible state of
defense." ' 79 On top of these developments, armed rebellions had broken out in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the year preceding the convention. s0
Clearly, the times called for decisive action on matters of defense and foreign
affairs, as free as possible of transitory emotions. The Framers recognized that
the very nature of deliberative legislative bodies would on occasion render
declared by Congress or unless a state of war actually exists under recognized principles of international
law," and the second directing the withdrawal of troops and Marines from Nicaragua within nine
months. The first was rejected by a vote of 22 to 52 and the second by 20 to 53. 69 CONG. REc.
7192 (1928).
78. See THE FEDERALST No. 4, at 18-19 (J Jay) (1941) ("dangers from foreign force"); L.
KAPLAN, COLONIEs INTO NATION: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1763-1801, at 163-166 (Great Britain), at 166-
169 (Spain), at 179-180 (dependent client of France) (1972).
79. Tan FEDERAmIST No. 4, at 18-19 (J. Jay) (1941).
80. The Framers held fresh memories of Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts in late-1786 and
early-1787, and a similar armed disorder in New Hampshire in September 1786. See infra notes 91-
99 and accompanying text.
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Congress unequal to the vigorous action which might be required. It is incon-
ceivable that the Framers planned to meet the ominous foreign and security
problems of the day by allowing a reluctant or divided legislature to block steps
necessary for the survival of the newly formed republic. Instead, they understood
that the Executive must in some instances take action on his own initiative
without waiting for on-the-spot authority from Congress.
It must be remembered that the Framers had witnessed at firsthand the total
disarrangement of military affairs by the Continental Congress during the War
of Independence. Of the fifty-five Framers who attended the Constitutional
Convention, no less than thirty had performed military duty in the revolution."'
These men knew that at the time of the American Revolution, Congress possessed
all the powers of the Executive and Legislature.12 They knew that the directives
of the Continental Congress had seriously interfered with General Washington's
operations and had nearly caused disaster.83
It was the Continental Congress, for example, which twice decided on
absolutely impractical plans for attacking Canada, without consulting a single
military expert,8 ' and which by its Resolution of October 11, 1776, influenced
General Washington to defend a fort at Harlem Heights by "every art and
whatever expense," resulting in the loss of over 2,600 American men.8 5 It was
Congress's order in the fall of 1777 which made it difficult for Washington to
obtain reinforcements from the Northern Army. 6 He was thereby prevented from
saving American forts on the Delaware River, allowing the British to open
navigation of the river for the supply of its army. The Continental Congress is
also accountable for the tragedy at Valley Forge.8 7 In August of 1777, the
Congress threw out a military commissary-general hand-picked by Washington
and assumed charge of the commissariat for itself, erecting a system "in direct
opposition to the opinion of the commander in chief.''8 John Marshall, who
served at Valley Forge, observed in his authoritative biography of Washington
that "Congress persisted in their system, and the effects of deranging, in the
midst of a campaign, so important a department as that must be which feeds
the troops, were not long in unfolding themselves." 9 Not only was Washington's
army prevented by Congress's action from making attacks on Howe's lines about
81. See generally the sketches of each Framer set out in C. RossrrER, 1787 THE GRAND
CONVENTION 79-144, 145, 146-156 (1966). At least six signers had been aides or confidants to General
Washington.
82. See D. HIoamnoTm, supra note 51, at 91-92; M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
266-269 (1940).
83. John Marshall offers his on-the-scene narrative: "Congress were disposed to be regulated in
their plans, rather by their wishes, than by the means placed in the hands of their military commanders
for the execution of them. . . ." J. MARSHALL, 3 THE LIn oF GEORGE WASHINGTON 5 (2d ed. 1926).
84. J. MARSHALL, 4 Tan Lim OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 30-41 (2d ed. 1926).
85. J. MARsHALL, 2 THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 485-502 (2d ed. 1926). Washington wrote
that the decision not to abandon the fort was "repugnant to my own judgment." J. FLExNER,
GEORGE WASHINGTON I IN THE AMERICAN REVOLrION 138, 145, 149 (1967).
86. T. FROTHINGHAM, WASHINGTON, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 228-230 (1930).
87. D. WATSON, 2 THE CONSTrrUTION OF TE UNITED STATES 912 (1910).
88. J. MARSHALL, supra note 83, at 276.
89. Id. at 277.
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Philadelphia, but the lack of clothing, food and blankets had terrible results as
cold weather came on. As summarized by one military historian: "The amount
of harm, caused by the unwise military control usurped by Congress, can only
be measured in terms of the appalling sufferings of the American soldiers at
Valley Forge. . .."90
In contrast, the Framers also held fresh memories of Shays's Rebellion of
1786-87 in which Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts had singlehandedly called
out the militia and raised an army to restore order before the indecisive state
legislature could be moved to action.9' "Finding that the lenient measures which
had been taken by the legislature, to subdue the resentments of the insurgents,
only enlarged their demands," Marshall relates, Governor Bowdoin determined
"on a vigorous exertion of all the powers he possessed, for the protection and
defense of the commonwealth. Upwards of 4000 militia were ordered into service
.... "9 Since "the public treasury did not afford the means of keeping this
force in the field a single week," the Governor again took affairs in his own
hands, actually heading a number of citizens who financed the proposed expe-
dition entirely with private money.93 After hearing an explanation from Bowdoin
of the necessity for "vigorous and effectual measures,' 94 the legislature replied
by expressing its "entire satisfaction in the measures you have been pleased to
take, pursuant to the powers vested in you by the Constitution, for the subduing
a turbulent spirit . . . . '9 Thus did the legislative body convey its understanding
of the Executive's broad defense authorities under the 1780 Massachusetts Con-
stitution, one of the leading models available to the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution in 1787.
A similar outbreak against a state government took place about the same
time in New Hampshire, when an armed mob surrounded the legislature and
intimidated legislators. 96 The rebellion "was crushed by the instant and vigorous
exertions of General [John] Sullivan, who was at the head of the executive of
that state.'' 97 Sullivan personally ordered out the nearest companies of cavalry
and infantry and took command of the loyal troops.98 The news of these incidents,
and the way in which they were successfully handled by firm action of state
executives, spread throughout the young nation. Clearly, this information favor-
ably influenced the view of the Framers toward the role of the Executive in
caring for the public safety. The Framers made no narrow distinction between
domestic insurrections and foreign threats. General Henry Knox, then Secretary
90. T. FROTHNHAM, supra note 86, at 234.
91. Local newspapers spread word of Bowdoin's strong action in suppressing the revolt. Boston
Gazette, Jan. 29, Feb. 5, & Feb. 12, 1787; Massachusetts Gazette (Boston), Jan. 30, Feb. 6, Feb. 9,
& Feb. 20, 1787.
92. J. MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 103. See also M. STARKEY, A LITE REBELION 49, 186
(1955).
93. J. MARSHAuL, supra note 51, at 104.
94. Governor Bowdoin's speech is printed in the Boston Gazette, Feb. 5, 1787.
95. The reply of the Senate and House of Representatives appears in the Massachusetts Gazette
(Boston), Feb. 6, 1787.
96. E. STACKPoLE, 2 HISTORY OF NEw HAPSHIRE 243 (1916). The riots occurred in September
1786.
97. J. MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 95. Sullivan's official title was "President."
98. E. STACKPOLE, supra note 96, at 244.
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of War, wrote Washington that as a result of these disorders, "[mien of reflection
and principle are determined to endeavour and to establish a government ...
which will be efficient in cases of internal commotions or foreign invasions.'"'"
Liberty was at stake; whether the threat be from domestic or external sources
made no difference.
Those who would dwell upon the concern of the Framers with a monarchial
presidency would do well to study the strong fear our forefathers had of an
unregulated Congress. James Wilson said at the Pennsylvania ratification con-
vention that "[tlo control the power and conduct of the legislature by an over-
ruling constitution, was an improvement in the science and practice of government
reserved to the American States."' l Jefferson, in language quoted in the Fed-
eralist, depicted legislative government as being the equivalent of "despotic
government.''0 If the Framers had really meant to provide the U.S. Congress
with the entire panoply of war powers - the exclusive power to decide when to
employ the armed forces, the power to compel an instant halt to any military
activity already begun, the power to define or limit the geographical areas where
the forces shall be deployed and even to set numerical limits upon deployments
in specified areas - they certainly had a perfect model before them in the
Articles of Confederation. This intent is doubtful, however, based on Congress's
concern with vesting excessive power in the Legislature. In addition, the Framers
had a first-hand recognition of the inadequacies of the Legislature in deliberating
upon and conducting defensive war. Article IX conferred upon the Continental
Congress the "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and
war. ' ' 1t2 The fact that the Constitutional Convention ignored this clear-cut lan-
guage, expressly voting to deny Congress the power to make "peace" and
changing the power of "determining on" war to the limited power of declaring
war, 03 is persuasive evidence that the Framers intended the legislative branch to
have far less authority over military matters than it possessed under the Articles
of Confederation.
Another contemporary model the Framers could have followed, but did not,
was Article 26 of the South Carolina Constitution of 1776, which specifically
restrained the Executive by prescribing that the "governor and commander-in-
chief shall have no power to commence war, or conclude peace, or enter into




Again, one might ask, if the Framers meant to make the Executive no more than
the "agent" of the Legislature in matters of military defense, why did they not
say so by using the unambiguous words which were previously used?
99. J. MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 98.
100. 2 THE WORKS OF JA s WILSON 770 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) (speech delivered on Nov. 26,
1787, in the Pennsylvania Convention on the U.S. Constitution).
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 311 (Q. Madison) (1961).
102. 7 DocutrMNrrs OF AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 72, art. IX (M. Urofsky ed.
1989).
103. THE Raco S OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 319.
104. 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTrrTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES 3247, art. 26 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). The restriction is repeated in the 1778
South Carolina Constitution. Id. at 3255, art. 33.
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HISTORICAL PRACTICE
The consistent course of practice under the Constitution from the adminis-
tration of George Washington until the early 1970s adds additional support for
the principle that the President possesses independent power to employ the forces
established by Congress in defense of U.S. citizens and the survival of their
freedoms and country. A list compiled almost twenty years ago of instances in
which presidents had used or sanctioned the use of military force outside the
United States without a declaration of war'0 5 reveals that by 1973, the practice
had grown to 199 incidents. 1 6
This number does not include several situations where the Executive disa-
vowed or repudiated certain military engagements.'°7 Adding the military actions
occurring since 1973, such as in Libya, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and the
Persian Gulf,H the list would exceed two hundred Presidential defense initiatives
without a declaration of war. This total is supported by a recent study made by
the Library of Congress,'09 but the list could easily be doubled. In addition to
the use of the military forces as a combat instrument, an unclassified study
sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of
Defense has found that the United States has used the armed forces for political
objectives, that is, to influence the behavior of foreign leaders without engaging
in war, on 215 other instances in the three decades between January 1, 1946,
and October 31, 1975.110
More than half of these military actions took place outside the Western
Hemisphere,' 1 and ninety-eight of these actions lasted more than thirty days."
2
These actions thus demonstrate a consistent pattern of response by presidents to
foreign dangers with the use of that level of force which is needed and available
for self-defense at that moment in history."13 It is true that many early incidents
represented actions against pirates or stateless areas, but there were many excep-
tions. As the number of independent nations increased, the number of Presidential
military actions involving recognized states also increased. Rather than scoffing
at these early limited actions," 4 the skeptics might recognize that events have
swung full circle.
105. See Emerson, War Powers Legislation, supra note 2.
106. See War Powers Hearings, supra note 2.
107. Eight military engagements, subsequently disavowed by superiors, were omitted from the list
of military actions cited as precedents. Id. at 148, n.3.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15 and Table I.
109. See CONG. RES. SERV. Rep. No. 83-204F, supra note 2.
110. B. BLEcHMAN & S. KAPLAN, THE USE OF THE ARMED FORCES AS A POLMCAL INSTRUMENT I-
6 (1976).
111. See War Powers Hearings, supra note 2, at 154-155 (Appendix F).
112. Id. at 126-148 (Appendix A).
113. "When little force was needed ... little was used; when larger commitments were necessary,
they too were forthcoming." H. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making 50 B.U.L. REv. 19, 27 (1970).
114. In 1988, Professor Edwin B. Firmage, University of Utah, College of Law, argued "the
Commander in Chief clause is not really at issue" because the 200 incidents collect "into very
understandable, justifiable interventions." War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 314.
Professor Firmage groups these actions into five categories: protecting American citizens, invasions
of disputed territories claimed by the United States, demonstrations without combat, occupations of
Caribbean states authorized by treaty, and naval self-defense. Firmage said in the same testimony,
however, that "there is no base to hoist yourself up by treaty to have a war power that the President
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Instead of defense against uncivilized bands of eighteenth and early-nineteenth
century pirates, the U.S. and other world leaders are currently confronted with
the threat of illegal drug cartels living outside all rules and strictures of organized
governments or modern society. In fact, General Thomas Kelly, director of
operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told two House Subcommittees in
October 1989, he no longer used most of his time preparing to meet the communist
threat. Rather, he said: "I'm spending sixty percent of my time on the drug
war.""' In September 1989, the Pentagon confirmed that U.S. military advisers
will be authorized to leave bases to train Latin American anti-narcotics troops
"beyond secured areas . . "116 And in the same month, Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney instructed military commanders "to find ways to stop the flow of
narcotics, even if it means diverting troops from other activities.""' 7 His instruc-
tions included orders for the Navy's Atlantic Command "to prepare a plan for
a substantial Caribbean counternarcotics task force with appropriate planes and
ships to help reduce the flow of drugs from Latin America.""'
The Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, and Drug En-
forcement Administration, among other federal units, are even using satellites
"to spy on the maze of clandestine air strips, roads and factories run by the
illicit drug industry in South America.""' 9 These activities are funded by Congress
and thereby represent a collective judgment of the Executive and Legislature.'
2 0
But this massive concentration of national means cannot be called "trivial," just
as the undeclared military actions of earlier presidents against nongovernmental
groups cannot be dismissed as mere "police actions" or "short temper," as
historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. would have it.'
2 '
simply lacks." Id. at 312. He also rejected "the protection of U.S. citizens abroad" as being "without
any base in constitutional law" because such persons "place themselves there under the sovereignty
of another state." Id. at 313. Thus, Firmage's testimony is self-contradictory. He denies the standing
of treaties or the defense of citizens as a base of Presidential authority, yet he uses those same
situations to justify (and dismiss) the instances in which presidents have intervened unilaterally.
115. Military Commanders Preparing to Meet a Different Threat, Washington Post, Oct. 18,
1989, at A29, col. 1.
116. Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
117. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
118. Id. The expanded role of the military in the Bush Administration's drug war includes
authority for armed U.S. Marines to assist in the drug interdiction efforts of the Border Patrol. In
addition, a legal opinion issued November 3, 1989 by the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel finds that military forces may arrest drug traffickers outside U.S. borders. Washington Post,
Dec. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
119. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at A6, col. 1. Moreover, the U.S. Navy has reportedly proposed
deploying a flotilla of warships operating off Columbia to monitor and interdict drug traffic in that
area. Washington Post, Nov. 24, 1989, at A27, col. 1.
120. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102 Stat. 1933
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2431 note (1988)) (drug interdiction); Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-463, 102 Stat. 2270 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1584 note (1988)) ($300
million total for drug-interdiction).
121. E.g., the distinguished historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. explains away these incidents by
claiming "the operations were mostly directed against nongovernmental groups, mostly concerned
with the protection of American citizens and mostly trivial." A. SCHLESINGER JR., supra note 1, at
61-62. In contrast, Edward Corwin evaluated an earlier tabulation of 100 Presidential military actions
as follows: "While inviting some pruning, the list demonstrates beyond peradventure the power of
the President, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, to judge whether a situation requires
the use of available forces to support American rights abroad and to take action in accordance with
Making War Without a Declaration
From this record, it is suggested that if the concept of a 'living Constitution'
means anything, it surely encompasses the notion that in a society in which
ultimate sovereignty rests with the people, the Constitution is reflective of how
they live and act under that charter. Furthermore, one of the most important
interpretative authorities in such a democratic system is found in the expectations
which the people and their chosen officials have thereby created. While repeated
violation of the Constitution cannot make constitutional what was once uncon-
stitutional, a long and unchallenged practice does, according to judicial prece-
dents, put a gloss on society's understanding of the Constitution and may fix
the proper construction to be given ambiguous provisions.
In the words of Justice Story, "the most unexceptionable source of collateral
interpretation is from the practical exposition of the government itself, in its
various departments, upon particular questions discussed, and settled upon their
own single merits."' A leading present-day authority on the law of foreign
affairs agrees:
[T]he emphasis upon usage, as a test of constitutionality ... was based upon
the notions that a people's genuine "constitution" is in how they live and
cooperate under a basic charter and that the most important authority in a
democratic community is in the expectations that people create in each other by
such living and cooperation. The most important principle of interpretation in
any legal system I have studied is that which requires examination of "subsequent
conduct" as an index of contemporary expectation.
12 1
Usage was decisive in resolving a separation of powers issue between two
branches of the government as early as the Marshall Court. In 1802, Congress
enacted the Judiciary Act, which continued the former practice of the Supreme
Court Justices riding circuit. Chief Justice Marshall promptly wrote letters to the
Associate Justices stating that he doubted the constitutionality of this provision
upon the ground that the Constitution required separate appointments for holding
circuit court. He suggested the possibility that his colleagues refuse to carry out
the law.'1' Even with such a serious cloud of doubt over Congress's authority to
require additional judicial duties of the Justices, the Marshall Court, with Marshall
not voting, abided by the principle of usage: "To this objection, which is of
recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it
for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction."'' 25
Usage has also been accepted by the Supreme Court on at least two other
occasions as a basis for rejecting a congressional attempt to reverse its earlier
acceptance of executive authority. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,' 26 the
that decision."
Corwin, Who Has the Power to Make War, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1949, (Magazine), at 14
122. J. STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrITIoN OF THE UNITED STATES 290 (Boston 1858).
123. Letter from Professor Myers McDougal to Barry M. Goldwater (Jan. 12, 1973).
124. L. BAKER, JOHN MARsHAL: A LwE IN LAW 378-381 (1974).
125. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). Justice Marshall did not participate in
the decision. Practice also served as the decisive source of constitutional construction in McPherson
v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 35-36 (1892).
126. 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915).
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Court approved the validity of a long-continued practice of the President to
withdraw public land from private acquisition even though this conflicted with a
federal statute which made such lands free and open to occupation and purchase.
That practice fixed the construction which, the Court explained, "is not reasoning
in a circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the
meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the
usage itself - even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investiga-
tion."'' 2 A decade later, the Court again relied on usage as a basis for rejecting
legislative control of the Presidency. The Court held that Congress could not
reverse seventy-three years of prior practice by imposing conditions on the removal
of executive officers by the President, even though the removal authority had
often been the subject of bitter controversy and an impeachment trial in the
past.
Nor can we concur .. .that when Congress, after full consideration and with
the acquiescence and long practice of all the branches of the Government, has
established the construction of the Constitution, it may by its mere subsequent
legislation reverse such construction. It is not given power by itself thus to amend
the Constitution.12
More recently, in reviewing executive discretion to settle claims of American
hostages and nationals against the terrorist regime in Iran, the Supreme Court
once again relied on the value of past executive practice as raising a presumption
of Presidential authority. 29 The facts of these cases closely parallel debate over
the military command powers, except here there are 200 years of practice in
which presidents have acted on their own initiative in response to any crisis which
they believed might present an unacceptable threat to national safety. Many
presidents have been criticized by both Houses for taking these strong military
actions, 130 but Congress had never once before the 1970's passed a law prohibiting,
or ordering a halt to, any of these conflicts. If the rule of the above cases is
applicable, Congress cannot now, after acquiescence for almost two centuries,
reverse the construction of the Constitution which has become so firmly set by
practice.
SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
Notwithstanding the current voices of astonishment over claims on behalf of
the Executive's exercise of independent power to employ military force, 3 ' many-
127. Id. at 472-473 (emphasis added).
128. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 152 (1926).
129. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
130. E.g., President Tyler was denounced in Congress and threatened with impeachment because
he had deployed military units to protect Texas against Mexico in 1844, before Texas was a state.
C. BERDAHI, WAR POWERS OF rH ExEcuTivE IN THE UNITED STATES 47-49, 70-74 (1970). President
Polk was rebuked by a nonbinding resolution passed by the House of Representatives which declared
that the war with Mexico, which his military maneuvers had precipitated, "was unnecessarily and
unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." Id.
131. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 1. His premise is that the Office of the President,
particularly "the contemporary Presidency," has appropriated powers "reserved by the Constitution
and by long historical practice to Congress." Id. at 10. Schlesinger adds: "There is no evidence that
anyone [among the Founders] supposed that his office as Commander in Chief endowed the President
with an independent source of authority." Id. at 18.
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public officials and leading authorities throughout the greater part of our history
have recognized that a broad self-defense power is vested by the Constitution in
the President. On May 22, 1798, Secretary of War, James McHenry, moved the
United States close to all-out war with France by ordering Navy Captain Richard
Dale to convoy U.S. merchantmen sailing off the coast between the Capes of
Virginia and Long Island and, if attacked while on the high seas, "to defend
Yourself to the Utmost."'' 2 This action was ordered before legislative passage of
the major laws supporting defense of U.S. commerce against French decrees
which treated American crews and American merchant vessels virtually as enemies
of France.' Also, before enactment of those laws, Representative Jonathan
Dayton, the then Speaker of the House and a signer of the U.S. Constitution,
defended the Adams Administration arguing that the President, as Commander
in Chief, was the official "whom the Constitution has made exclusively the
judge" of employing the army and navy of the United States wherever he




That the Commander-in-Chief possessed the Constitutional power of employing
these armed vessels in time of peace, he himself had no doubt, for he did not
see any distinction in principle between employing a naval force to protect our
merchantmen in the prosecution of a fair and lawful trade, or in enforcing the
observance of the law of nations and employing the military in enforcing the
execution of the municipal law."
Three years later President Thomas Jefferson's Cabinet met to consider what
action to take against despoliation of U.S. commerce by the Barbary Powers.
Secretary of Treasury Alexander Gallatin construed the President's Commander
in Chief power as follows: "The exve [sic] can not put us in a state of war, but
if we be put into that state either by the decree of Congress or of the other
nation, the command and direction of the public force then belongs to the exve
[sic]." 3 6 Acting on this advice, Jefferson ordered Captain Dale to move a
squadron of ships into the Mediterranean "to protect our commerce and chastise
their insolence ... by sinking, burning or destroying their ships and vessels
132. OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LiBRARY, U.S. NAvY DEPT., NAVAL DocuMENTS RELATED
TO TtE QuAsi-WA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 77 (1935). On March 19, 1798, Adams
had issued an order, without authority of Congress, enabling American merchant vessels to arm for
defense against attack by French warships. 8 ANNAIS OF CONG. 1271 (1851). Adams acted contrary
to the opinion of members of Congress who believed such a decision "must lead to war." Id. at
1254-1263.
133. Major laws supporting the quasi-war with France began with the two acts of May 28, 1798,
1 Stat. 558 (1798) (provisional army), and 1 Stat. 561 (1798) (instructions to commanders of public
armed ships); the act of June 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 565 (1798) (suspension of commerce going to France);
and the act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 572 (1798) (defense of merchant vessels). These laws were all
enacted after Adams had allowed the arming of American merchant vessels and issued his active
defense orders to Captain Dale.
134. 8 ANNALs OF CONG. 1409-1411 (1851). Dayton was the youngest delegate who attended the
Constitutional Convention. 5 DICTIONARY OF AmERcAN BioowsHs 166 (1930).
135. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1454-1455 (1851).
136. 1 TaE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 365-366 (P. Ford ed. 1904) (Cabinet meeting of May
15, 1801) (emphasis added).
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wherever you shall find them."'13 7 It was months after fighting broke out that
Jefferson came to Congress for authority.'38
And in 1836, former President John Quincy Adams asserted:
The declaration of war is in its nature a legislative act, but the conduct of war
is and must be executive. However startled we may be at the idea that the
Executive Chief Magistrate has the power of involving the nation in war, even
without consulting Congress, an experience of fifty years has proved that in
numberless cases he has and must have exercised the power .... Defensive war
must necessarily be among the duties of the Executive Chief Magistrate. 3 9
Thus, the claim that reliance on the Commander-in-Chief clause as an independent
source of executive authority is a modern phenomenon is illusory.
The opinions put into practice by Adams and Jefferson have constituted the
general voice of scholarship throughout succeeding years until the Vietnam War
traumatized American politicians. As early as 1862, William Whiting, one of the
great lawyers of his time, compiled a work on the war powers of the President
in which he declared:
Congress may effectually control the military power, by refusing to vote supplies,
or to raise troops, and by impeachment of the President; but for the military
movements and measures essential to overcome the enemy-for the general
conduct of the war-the President is responsible to and controlled by no other
department of government."10
John Pomeroy, Dean of the New York University Law School in the 1860s,
rejected the idea that "the disposition and management of the land and naval
forces would be in the hands of Congress . . . . "'14' Pomeroy instructs that "[t]he
policy of the Constitution is very different, . . . [and] [i]t was felt that active
hostilities, under the control of a large deliberative body, would be feebly carried
on, with uniform disastrous results."' 42 He also said that the Legislature may:
[Flurnish the requisite supplies of money and materials [and] authorize the raising
of men, [but] all direct management of warlike operations, all planning and
organizing of campaigns, all establishing of blockades, all direction of marches,
sieges, battles, and the like, are as much beyond the jurisdiction of the legislature,
as they are beyond that of any assemblage of private citizens."
3
The Constitution, however, explicitly authorizes Congress to pass laws which
are necessary and proper for executing all powers vested by the Constitution in
137. OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AN LmAnY, U.S. NAVY DEPT., 1 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED
TO THE UNITED STATES WARS WITH THE BARBARY PowERS 467 (1939).
138. Jefferson informed Congress that he had sent the squadron to the Mediterranean in his first
annual message and piously stated that he was unauthorized "without the sanction of Congress, to
go beyond the line of defence [sic]". See President's Message, Dec. 8, 1801, 11 ANNALS OF CONG.
11-12 (1801). Jefferson's report to Congress was made after an intense battle had already broken
out.
139. J. ADAms, AN EutLooY ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF JAs MADIsoN 47 (1836).
140. W. WrriNTo, supra note 59, at 163-164.
141. J. POMEROY, supra note 60, at 288-289.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 289.
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the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. 144
In response, Pomeroy states that "these measures must be supplementary to, and
in aid of, the separate and independent functions of the President as commander
in chief; they cannot interfere with, much less limit, his discretion in the exercise
of those functions."'
1 45
In 1910, Dr. David Watson wrote that of all the explanations of why the
Constitution should make the President Commander-in-Chief of the military and
naval forces of the country:
IN]one seems more reasonable than the fact that during the Revolution Wash-
ington experienced great trouble and embarrassment resulting from the failure of
Congress to support him with firmness and dispatch. There was a want of
directness in the management of affairs during that period which was attributable
to the absence of centralized authority to command. The members of the
Convention knew this and probably thought they could prevent its recurrence by
making the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. Doubtless,
also, the Convention was influenced by precedents, of which there were many,
running back for a long period.'16
Watson additionally stated that "[t]he power is vested in the President to dispose
of or arrange the component-parts of the Army and Navy at his pleasure ...
While Congress can make rules for the Army and Navy, it cannot interfere with
the President's power as commander of such forces."' 47
In the 1920's, Professor Westel Willoughby observed that the President's
foreign affairs initiative "makes it possible for him to bring about a situation in
which, as a practical proposition, there is little option left to Congress as to
whether it will or will not declare war or recognize a state of war as existing."' 4
Willoughby did not mean to imply that this state was improper and could be
checked by Congress. He wrote that the power of the President to send United
States forces outside the country in time of peace "when this is deemed necessary
or expedient as a means of preserving or advancing the foreign interests or
relations of the United States" is a "discretionary right constitutionally vested




Professor Clarence Berdahl, in his outstanding 1920 thesis on the war powers
of the Executive, commented:
The members of the Convention probably had not forgotten the trouble and
embarrassment caused during the Revolution by congressional interference and
the lack of a centralized control over the army. They were very likely influenced
also by the precedents in the practise of European states, in former plans of
union for the colonies, and in the recently established state constitutions.' 10
Anticipating legislative proposals of the kind embodied in the War Powers
Resolution of 1973,111 Berdahl was careful to add:
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
145. J. POMEROY, supra note 60, at 289.
146. D. WATSON, supra note 87, at 912.
147. Id. at 914.
148. W. WiLLouGHBY, 3 TsE CONSTrrUmONAL LAW OF THE UNTrED STATES 1558 (2d ed. 1929).
149. Id. at 1567.
150. C. BERDAL, supra note 130, at 115.
151. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973)).
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Although there has been some contention that Congress, by virtue of its power
to declare war and to provide for the support of the armed forces, is a superior
body, and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is "but the Executive arm,
. .. in every detail and particular, subject to the commands of the lawmaking
power," practically all authorities agree that the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, occupies an entirely independent position, having powers that are exclu-




Just as the President decides when and where troops shall be employed in time
of war, so he alone likewise determines how the forces shall be used, for what
purposes, the manner and extent of their participation in campaigns, and the
time of their withdrawal.'
Professor Edward Corwin, who was selected by Congress to edit the Con-
gressionally sponsored Constitution Annotated, 54 also recognized the President's
authority to commit military forces abroad on his own initiative.'" In 1949, he
wrote that this power "had developed into an undefined power - almost
unchallenged from the first and occasionally sanctified judicially - to employ
without Congressional authorization the armed forces in the protection of Amer-
ican rights and interests abroad whenever necessary."' 56 Professor Quincy Wright,
one of the preeminent scholars of international law in this century, wrote in
1969:
I conclude that the Constitution and practice under it have given the President,
as Commander-in-Chief and conductor of foreign policy, legal authority to send
the armed forces abroad; to recognize foreign states, governments, belligerency,
and aggression against the United States or a foreign state; to conduct foreign
policy in a way to invite foreign hostilities; and even to make commitments
which may require the future use of force. By the exercise of these powers he
may nullify the theoretically exclusive power of Congress to declare war.'
57
Thus did Wright reaffirm his position first expressed nearly fifty years earlier:
The powers of the Commander in Chief extend to the conduct of all military
operations in time of peace and of war, thus embracing control of the disposition
of troops, the direction of vessels of war and the planning and execution of
campaigns, and are exclusive and independent of Congressional power.' 5'
Added to the weight of the above authorities is the opinion given by the
present Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court when he was an official in the
Justice Department during the Nixon Administration. In 1970, William Rehnquist
152. C. BEIDABL, supra note 130, at 116-117 (quoting 59 CoNG. REc. 2135 (1906) (statement of
Sen. Bacon).
153. Id. at 122.
154. CoNsTrruTnoN ANNOTATED (E. Corwin ed. 1952).
155. An eminent constitutional scholar agrees that the President "possesses the organizational
authority to resort to the use of force to protect American rights and interests abroad and to fulfill
the commitments of the nation under international agreements." B. ScuwARTz, supra note 48, at
196.
156. Corwin, supra note 121, at 14.
157. Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces Abroad, 10 VA. J. INT'L. L.
43, 54 (1969).
158. Wright, supra note 43, at 134.
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testified that: (1) there is no prohibition in the Constitution which keeps the
President from initiating war without the declaration of Congress; and (2) no
statute could "prevent the President from exercising his traditional powers as
Commander in Chief, which do include under certain circumstances the commit-
ment of armed forces to hostilities."1
9
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
Of the few judicial statements which consider the issue, most uphold the
power of the President to make and continue hostilities without a declaration of
war. In approving President Lincoln's blockade of the Confederacy, the Supreme
Court wrote by analogy that when "a war be made by invasion of a foreign
nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.
He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting
for any special legislative authority."' 16 The principle of national self-defense
expressed in the Prize Cases thus ratifies each of the undeclared wars cited
above. 16' Relying on this case, Professor Bernard Schwartz, a well-known con-
stitutional scholar, has written:
The language of the High Court in the Prize Cases is broad enough to empower
the President to do much more than merely parry a blow already struck against
the nation. Properly construed, in truth, it constitutes juristic justification of the
many instances in our history (ranging from Jefferson's dispatch of a naval
squadron to the Barbary Coast to the 1962 blockade of Cuba) in which the
President has ordered belligerent measures abroad without a state of war having
been declared by Congress."2
Other judicial precedents bear out the power of the Executive to use such
force as is necessary for self-defense purposes. Supreme Court Justice Nelson, a
member of the Court from 1845 and sitting as a circuit judge in 1860, held that
the President's duty to execute the laws includes a duty to protect citizens
abroad. 63 The justice wrote: "It is to him . . . the citizens abroad must look for
protection of person and of property, and for the faithful execution of the laws
existing and intended for their protection. For this purpose, the whole executive
power of the country is placed in his hands . . " 164 He continued:
Now, as it respects the interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection
of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest in the
discretion of the president. Acts of lawless violence, or of threatened violence to
the citizen or his property, cannot be anticipated and provided for; and the
159. Hearings on Congress, the President, and the War Powers Before the Subcomm. on National
Security Policy and Scientific Developments, and the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. at 228-229, 232 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of William Rehnquist).
160. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863). The Court's opinion, written by Justice
Grier, states that one of the threshold questions presented was whether the President possessed a
right to initiate military action "on the principles of international law, as known and acknowledged
among civilized States." Id. at 665. The Court decided the "President was bound to meet [the
emergency] in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name
.... " Id. at 669.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 2-15, 105-121.
162. B. ScHWARTz, THE REINS OF PowER 98 (1963).
163. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186).
164. Id. at 112.
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protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently, require the
most prompt and decided action .... The great object and duty of government
is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the people composing it,
whether abroad or at home .... 161
The Supreme Court endorsed this concept by declaring in a later case that
a citizen is entitled "to demand the care and protection of the Federal government
over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction
of a foreign government.''6 Likewise, in 1866, four concurring Supreme Court
Justices stated that "Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns .... "167
Later, the Supreme Court affirmed a holding in which the Court of Claims had
said that "Congress cannot in the disguise of 'rules for the government' of the
Army impair the authority of the President as commander in chief."' 6 Another
broad endorsement of the President's scope of power is found in Fleming v.
Page. 69 Here the Supreme Court said, "[a]s Commander in Chief, he [the
President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem
most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy."'
70
These judicial pronouncements do not definitively settle the legal issue of
the President's relations with Congress. Rather, it is suggested that strong support
for the President's independent defense role can be found in judicial opinions,
certainly enough to outweigh the few cases that have been invoked for congres-
sional supremacy over war-making. Those cases essentially fall into a category
of three early decisions stemming out of the capture of ships during the undeclared
French Naval War of John Adams's Administration. 7' They involved the inter-
pretation of statutes enacted by Congress under its power to "make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water,"'' 72 not the issue of whether Adams
had prosecuted an illegal war.' 73 The fundamental fact is that the Supreme Court
165. Id.
166. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). The Court included protection
of "life, liberty, and property" among the privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. Id.
167. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866). Once war is declared, the President is
vested with "such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a
successful war." United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895).
168. Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221, aff'd. 165 U.S. 553 (1897). The Court of
Claims has also stated that the exercise of the Commander in Chief powers needed no legislative
ratification "to give to them effective force." Warner, Barnes and Co. v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl.
1, 32 (1904).
169. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
170. Id. at 615.
171. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Talbot v. The Ship Amelia & Seeman, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 34 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 36 (1800).
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
173. Bas v. Tingy raised the narrow question of whether a vessel recaptured from the French
should be governed by the rule of compensation provided by the act of June 28, 1798 (1 Stat. 574,
§ 2), which allowed one-eighth for salvage, or the act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 709, 716, § 7),
which permitted up to a one-half share of the ship and cargo for salvage. 4 U.S. at 39-40.
Talbot v. Seeman again presented the question of the amount of salvage due the U.S. ship
captain who recaptured a vessel from the French. The Court was required to make an interpretation
of five statutes regulating salvage. The question of independent Executive authority was not before
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has never ordered the President to halt any ongoing military action. In the
absence of any conclusive Supreme Court holding, it is appropriate to shift the
debate to policy considerations. Is it wise, is it practical, is it helpful to society
to enact legislation such as the War Powers Resolution? And, how might the
two branches work together to shape a common destiny for the Republic in the
sphere of national defense?
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Sixty Days War: Forty-Eight Hours Report
Regardless of the weight of so much informed opinion and the long record
of earlier practice, the Congress, in 1973, overrode President Nixon's veto and
put into law a restraint on unilateral executive decisions to employ U.S. forces
abroad. The law was enacted in the emotional atmosphere of the closing days
of the Vietnam War, simultaneously with the Watergate coverup investigations.
The last report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the legislation
takes specific notice of this fact. "The immediate legislative history of the war
powers bill can be dated to the controversial Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964
and the subsequent conduct of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia without
valid Congressional authorization."' 74
The combination of Watergate and Vietnam, with their destructive impact
on American politics, morale and self-confidence, may yet have a devastating
effect on the national interest as a result of this unprecedented legislation.
The stated purpose of the War Powers Resolution, as announced in section
2(a), is to:
[I]nsure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations."'
These words disguise the true end of the statute which is to veto the President's
direction of the armed forces. Section 2(c) declares that:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
the Court. 5 U.S. at 29-31.
Little v. Barreme also involved the interpretation of an Act of Congress providing for prize
money (Act of Feb. 9, 1799, 1 Stat. 613, 615. § 5). The American Captain mistakenly seized a
neutral ship, believing it to be a U.S. vessel, without authority from either President Adams or an
act of Congress. Captain Little was held answerable in damages to the owner. In dictum, Chief
Justice Marshall stated that Presidential instructions could not have excused Captain Little's action
even if the vessel had not been owned by a neutral because Congress had only allowed captures of
American ships going to, not from, French ports. 6 U.S. at 179. The Court's decision, however,
expressly exempted the U.S. government from liability for damages, and since President Adams did
not claim any authority outside the statute, his independent power of action was not involved on the
facts of the case. Id.
174. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1973).
175. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1982).
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(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories
or possessions, or its armed forces.76
Moreover, Section 3 provides that:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and
after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until
United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been
removed from such situations.'"
Section 4 requires that reports be provided within forty-eight hours to
Congress whenever military forces are introduced: (1) into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for resupply or training; or (3) in numbers which
substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already
located in a foreign nation. 78 When a section 4(1) hostilities type report is
required, a sixty-day clock starts ticking. Under section 5(b) the President shall,
within sixty calendar days, terminate any use of United States Armed Forces
with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted),
unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization
for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-
day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States.'
79
The sixty-day period may be extended for not more than an additional thirty
days if necessary for safely removing the troops.'" But section 5(c) also provides
that at any time, even before the lapse of sixty days, U.S. military forces may
be ordered withdrawn "if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.' 18'
Congress does not allow just any statute to rise to the level of authority for
war. When Congress speaks of "a specific authorization for such use of United
States Armed Forces" in section 5, it does not mean appropriations approved
for carrying on the military operations, nor does it mean authority pursuant to
any treaty obligation. Section 8(a)(1) states that authority to introduce American
troops into hostilities or threatened hostilities "shall not be inferred [from] any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically
...states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within
the meaning of this joint resolution.' ' 8 2 Subsection (a)(2) establishes the same
disavowal concerning "any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified."' 83 In other
words, the NATO alliance is a dead letter insofar as the War Powers Resolution
is concerned, as is the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense"
176. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982).
177. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982).
178. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1982).
179. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
180. Id.
181. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982). Sections 5(b) and 5(c) clearly violate the Presentment Clause of
the U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
182. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (1982).
183. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(2) (1982).
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provision of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.' 8 Unless a brand new
statute, specifically linked to the War Powers Resolution is enacted, the President
is not to claim any justification for the use of force under these or other treaties,
or pursuant to any funding measure.
Section 2 of the War Powers Resolution tells us where Congress claims the
power to act as a court and define in precise detail what the constitutional law
of the nation is, even to the extent of deciding what nature of legislation
constitutes the functional equivalent of a declaration of war.18 Here, Congress
makes the arbitrary and unfounded assumption that the authority to make all
laws for executing the powers vested in the other departments of the United
States (the Necessary and Proper Clause) is a means of limiting and restraining
the exercise of those other governmental powers. This claim has been refuted
based upon the previous analysis which concludes that Congress may "aid" in
the execution of other authorities, but not "thwart" the conduct of those other
functions.
Policy Considerations
The War Powers Resolution is not only unconstitutional under the preceding
discussion, it is dangerous to the country's safety because it denies flexibility to
the President in the conduct of foreign relations and conveys a message of
potential disunity in the American government. Further, the War Powers Reso-
lution constitutes bad policy because it might bring about an unnecessary vote
at a dangerous moment of history when public opinion is not yet informed or
mature enough to render a reasoned judgment. As one of the first opponents of
war powers legislation, Professor James McGregor Burns, testified in 1970:
Artificial restrictions ... may lead not to peace, but to war, as foreign adversaries
estimate that the United States will not respond to a threat to world peace
because of legal restrictions on the executive ....
If our friends and foes abroad must try to estimate not only how our
President will respond to acts on their part, but also how a majority of the
House or Senate will respond, the element of uncertainty is increased,"
The uncertainty of which Professor Burns speaks may bring insecurity,
instability, and a miscalculation of U.S. intentions.
Moreover, the War Powers Resolution does not stand up to the test of
actual history. Consider what would have happened if the War Powers Resolution
had been enacted when Franklin Roosevelt took bold initiatives in support of
the democracies fighting Nazi Germany before the declaration of war of December
1941. Roosevelt had the vision to see that America and the rest of the free world
could avoid disaster only if he acted independently of Congress, and outside the
Neutrality Act restrictions, to help Great Britain resist the Nazi onslaught on the
civilized world. Neither Congress nor the American public knew of the secret
alliance between the United States and Britain. An alliance that began, in 1939,
184. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense .... " TREATiaS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AwERICA 1153, 1165 (C. Bevans ed. 1969) (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 51).
185. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (1982).
186. Hearings, supra note 159, at 82-83 (testimony of Professor James MacGregor Burns).
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with the exchange of correspondence on military matters between Roosevelt and
Winston Churchill, then, First Lord of the Admiralty in the Chamberlain Cabi-
net. 1
87
Public opinion of the time was "divided and confused."' s Many Americans
believed that Britain and Western Europe were doomed and that American aid
would either be lost in the Atlantic or fall into Hitler's hands. As late as
November 1941, a mild revision of the 1939 Neutrality Act to permit the arming
of American merchant vessels passed the House by a slim margin of 212 to
194.1s9 There was no national consensus of an uncontestable danger to the life
of the nation, nor any broad perception of emergency threatening the life of the
republic - criteria suggested by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. as the only
justification for resort to an extra-constitutional emergency prerogative power.19°
Yet Roosevelt acted. He exercised the initiative of decision making reserved to
every President. The steps he took were in the very nature of the executive power.
Congress was not consulted when President Roosevelt sent American troops
to establish bases in Greenland' 9' and Iceland,192 and to cooperate with British
armed forces already present there. Roosevelt's actions violated the Selective
Service Act of 1940 which expressly prohibited the deployment of any draftees
beyond the Western Hemisphere. This area had been narrowly described in the
course of Senate debate as the part of the Americas which "we have long engaged
to protect under the Monroe Doctrine."' 93 Nazi planes overflew these foreign
bases and it could not be known whether a German attack was coming or not.
187. It was Roosevelt who invited Churchill "to enter into direct correspondence with him."
ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL: THEIR SECRET WART1IM CORRESPONDENCE 79 (Lowenheim, Langley, &
Jonas eds. 1975).
According to William Stephenson, chief of British intelligence, Roosevelt issued secret instructions
in June 1940 to J. Edgar Hoover for the closest possible cooperation between the FBI and British
agents. Roosevelt also allowed British Security Coordination, a central agency of all British intelligence
groups, to direct worldwide underground operations against Nazi Germany from offices in New York
City. W. STEVENSON, A MAN CALLED INTREPID: THE SECRET WAR 78-80, 102 (1976). Roosevelt's
loathing for the whole Nazi regime was "in evidence by 1933." R. HERZSTEIN, ROOSEVELT AND
HITLER: PRELUDE TO WAR 413 (1989).
188. J. BURNS, supra note 12, at 148.
189. H.R.J. Res. 237, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. REC. 8891 (1941). The slim margin on
the vote demonstrated that "the President could not depend on Congress at this point to vote through
a declaration of war." J. BURNS, supra note 12, at 148. Nor, had the War Powers Resolution been
in force, could Roosevelt have depended on Congress for approval of military action following a §
4(a)(l) report.
190. See War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 41, 55 (testimony of Dr. Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr.). In fact, Roosevelt was so unsure of public opinion he went to extreme efforts to
avoid disclosure of his secret alliance with Britain. The chief of British intelligence wrote of President
Roosevelt:
He got us Flying Fortresses, having them secretly pushed over the frontier into Canada
because this way their delivery was less likely to draw hostile attention. He was getting
us hundreds of thousands of tons of metal for British arsenals, all done ... when men
close to the White House were shouting that this represented suicide for Roosevelt and
possibly for the nation, and amid cries that Britain was finished and all this material
would fall into Hitler's hands!
W. STEVENSON, supra note 187, at 144.
191. On April 10, 1941, Roosevelt announced he was sending American troops to establish bases
in Greenland. 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 96-99 (S. Rosenman
ed. 1950).
192. On July 7, 1941, Roosevelt informed Congress that, as Commander in Chief, he had sent
4400 Marines to join with a British garrison to occupy Iceland. Id. at 255-257.
193. 54 Stat. 885, 886; 86 CONG. REc. 10, 295 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 301-318 (1940)).
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Admiral Stark sent proposed instructions for Roosevelt's approval which left no
doubt of the situation. Stark asked Roosevelt to approve instructions which
"ordered the [Marine] force to cooperate with the British (in defending a British
base operated by the British against the enemy)."' Admiral Stark wrote: "I
realize that this is practically an act of war."' 95 Nevertheless, Roosevelt gave his
approval. '9
What would have been the outcome had Roosevelt laid these instructions
before the Congress and reported that U.S. Marines were committed to engage
in "practically an act of war?" Note that this was one year after Congress had
renewed the military draft by the smallest possible margin, a single vote.'9 If
Congress had been forced to vote on Roosevelt's risky action, is it not likely the
Legislature would have failed to sustain his decision? Nor would Congress have
been any more likely to approve of President Roosevelt's action in May of 1941,
when he secretly lent long-range U.S. amphibian planes to Great Britain and
assigned eighty navy airmen to help with a British mission to sink the German
battleship, Bismarck.'" And it is doubtful Congress would have ratified Roos-
evelt's instructions in September 1941 when he ordered American warships to
escort British convoys west of Iceland and to destroy German submarines "on
sight."' By forcing a vote in an almost isolationist Congress, the War Powers
Resolution would probably have brought total disaster to the democracies of the
1940s. This same concern applies equally to the future should a cautious and
hesitant Executive fail to meet the imperatives of an emergency because of the
inhibitions of the statute.
CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL ABUSE OF POWER
This is not to say that the President possesses unbridled war powers. He
cannot constitutionally initiate offensive wars of conquest or jealousy. The test,
however, is not the highly technical legal standard of "proportionate measure"
or any other standard to be found in the decrees of the International Court of
Justice.= Rather, the test is to be found in the standards of free government
applied by the American people in the political operations of a free Republic.
The President can only use the military forces Congress has put at his command.




197. H.R. 10,132, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 86 CONG. REc. 11,755 (1940).
198. W. STEVENSON, supra note 187, at 236.
199. J. BuRNs, supra note 12, at 140-141.
200. In Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27), the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") concluded that customary international law does not allow
the use of force in collective self-defense against "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision
of weapons of logistical or other support," referring to the conduct of Nicaragua in supplying arms
to Marxist revolutionaries in El Salvador. Id. Instead of "self-defense," the ICJ developed the novel
notion of "proportionate countermeasures" practiced by the victim state itself, not by an ally. Id.
For criticism of this decision, see the address to the American Society of International Law on
April 22; 1988, reprinted in War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 1085-1091. Needless to
say, the Framers could not have had in mind such a highly technical standard for purposes of judging
the President's conduct under the Constitution.
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He cannot usually raise and equip an army on his own authority; although
Lincoln did in the first days of the Civil War.201
The President must receive the Senate's consent to his appointments of
ambassadors, judges, and cabinet officers, and he needs the "advice and consent"
of the Senate in making treaties. If he wishes to serve another term, he must
stand for re-election after four years. Moreover, if he wants his political program
to succeed he knows that his own political party will be subject to popular will
in free elections held each two years. He also faces the constant scrutiny of a
free press and ultimately the legislative power of impeachment and removal from
office. The most extreme check on the power of the President, however, is
impeachment. Many lawyers do not realize that the constitutional term "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" means a political offense, a crime against the state.
It does not mean a crime in the sense of ordinary criminal statutes. It is a far
more serious offense because it undermines the viability of the political process
and basic political institutions and thereby affects all of society, not just a single,
unfortunate victim or class of victims.
It is important to remember that the original language of the "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" provision, accepted by the Constitutional Convention on
September 8, 1787, included the descriptive words "against the United States.
'20 2
The report by the Committee on Style and Arrangement on September 12, 1787,
dropped the latter words, 203 but without any authority or intent of changing the
substance of the clause. Thus, impeachment was seen as a category of offenses
against the political state.
In the very context we are considering, we have the words of Edmund
Randolph, who introduced the Virginia Plan at the Convention. The "propriety
of impeachments was a favorite principle with him," Randolph said, because the
"Executive will have great opportunities of abusing his power, particularly in
time of war when the military force and in some respects the public money will
be in his hands." 2°4 Moreover, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the subjects of
the Senate's jurisdiction in cases of impeachment "are those offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words, from the abuse
or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar
propriety be denominated POLITICAL as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.''205
In short, the President is subject to all the political processes of a free
government and free citizens operating under a written Constitution. He cannot
legally suspend the civil process created by that charter of government. 206 Yet he
201. In the ten week interval between the fall of Fort Sumter and the convening of Congress in
special session, "Lincoln amalgamated the available state militias into a ninety days' volunteer force,
called 40,000 volunteers for three years' service, added 23,000 to Regular Army and 18,000 to the
Navy, [and] paid out two millions from unappropriated funds in the Treasury to persons unauthorized
to receive it ...." E. CoRwiN, THE PRaswarr: OFFICE AND POWERs 229 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
202. THE REcoRDs oF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION oF 1787, supra note 1, vol. 2, at 545, 575.
203. Id. at 590, 600.
204. Id. at 67.
205. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
206. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304, 324 (1946).
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has the duty and responsibility of judging how best to defend the nation against
foreign threats. He may, as Thomas Jefferson suggested in his concept of the
"law of necessity, of self-preservation," have to act in the interest of "saving
our country when in danger" or when "some of its very high interests are at
stake." 2 7 In these circumstances, Jefferson advised, a public official or military
officer must perform his duty and "throw himself on the justice of his country
and the rectitude of his motives." 2m In turn "the controlling powers of the
constitution . . . are bound to judge according to the circumstances under which
he acts [and] to put themselves into his situation.''209
Like Franklin Roosevelt, of whom his speechwriter Robert Sherwood 210 tells
us, "never for a moment overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to his
immediate or eventual impeachment, ' 21' a president has an independent respon-
sibility to exercise his judgment on the needs of defending the nation in time of
crisis. He thereby subjects his action to the political will of the American people.
If the President does not act when required in the interest of saving the Republic,
he risks himself (and the nation) as much as if he had gone ahead and acted
boldly in the situation. For example, President John F. Kennedy believed he
would have been impeached if he had failed to react strongly to the Russian
missile threat in Cuba.
212
The issue of accountability is one in which the author disagrees with the
President's closest supporters, those who can be counted on to defend the
executive action whatever the issue and without any apparent standard, other
than a belief that the President is always right. For even in the area of self-
defense and action for the safety of the nation, someone has to be responsible
for the acts of the government and accountable to the American people. Clear
identity of the decision maker is one of the major grounds given by Hamilton
in his justification of uniting the executive power in a single person.2 ,3 But there
can be no accountability, no functioning of the political process and the checks
on abuse of power described above, if Presidential actions are kept secret. This
raises the question of covert intelligence operations. Such activities are beyond
the scope of this discussion, unless they involve the use of force and rise to the
level of an act of war. Military operations, such as mining foreign harbors,
bombing neutral nations, or supplying weapons systems to nations engaged in
war, whether performed by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Council, the regular armed forces or any other U.S. agency, are covered by any
207. 12 TE WRrrios OF THOMAS JEFnRSON 418 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1905).
208. Id. at 422.
209. Id.
210. Robert E. Sherwood, writer and playwright, was one of the major draftsmen of Roosevelt's
wartime speeches. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BioGRAPHY 623-624 (J. Garraty ed. 1977).
211. W. STEVENSON, supra note 187, at 255 (quoting R. SHERWOOD, ROOSVrT AN HOPKINS
(1948)). See also, id. at 238. It should be noted that the Lend Lease Act, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55
Stat. 31 (1941), did not provide authority for Roosevelt's military actions in the Atlantic. To the
contrary, § 3(d) expressly provided: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or permit
authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States." Id. at 32. No wonder
Roosevelt was concerned about impeachment.
212. R. KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 71. A leading historian believes Madison "might have been
impeached" had he not called for war against Britain in 1812. R. RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE
FOUNDINo FATHER 223 (1987).
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427-429 (A. Hamilton).
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serious concept of accountability. If the use of military force is concealed from
all other components of government and from the body politic itself, we have
become another form of government, a one person tyranny, and are no longer
a representative Republic.
There must be an opportunity at some point for review of the emergency
defense measure in question, for its possible approval or adjustment, or for its
disapproval accompanied by political censure or punishment. The ability of taking
the initiative when demanded in the national interest is and must be reserved to
the President, along with flexibility in exercising his discretion. Although these
attributes are essential to the achievement of legitimate national security goals,
long continued secrecy of acts of war are not. Within a time fitting to the
particular emergency, the Executive must place his decision and his acts before
the appropriate legislative leadership or before the entire Legislature and the
American people and thereby bear their judgment on his course. Lincoln assem-
bled an army and imposed martial law on his own, but his actions were public
knowledge. Roosevelt alone made the decision to order U.S. warships to attack
Axis submarines "on sight," but his decision was announced in a public radio
address. 214 Reagan directed an air strike on Libyan military installations on his
own authority, but the world learned of his action almost simultaneously. To
act is one thing. To try to keep the action forever secret is a different matter.
In a proper concept of Presidential war powers, excessive secrecy of warmaking
is not justified.
BYRD RESOLUTION
The present situation thus matches a measure of doubtful constitutionality,
which purports to prevent the President from acting unilaterally beyond sixty
days, against Presidential actions, historically regarded as appropriate. What steps
might at least improve this uncertain situation? Putting aside the purely legal
issues, how might the nation present itself as capable of purposefulness and unity
in time of national peril? What changes will prevent the erosion (or appearance
of erosion) of national authority and unity in the field of military defense?
Some may argue that the answer is clear. They believe that the President
merely has to ask for authorization. 215 President Gerald Ford did exactly that in
1975. He sent a special message to Congress seeking a waiver of the War Powers
Resolution so that he could evacuate Americans and our allies who had joined
the U.S. in resisting Communist aggression. In doing so, the President sought to
act with the shared deliberation of the Congress. 2 6 South Vietnamese defense
214. Roosevelt's "fireside chat" including the "shoot on sight" message is discussed in J. BuRNs,
supra note 12, at 140-141. There is always a problem that unilateral Presidential decisions to engage
in political or psychological operations that must be kept secret can grow into large quasi-military
campaigns such as the Bay of Pigs or the Contra operations in Nicaragua. The notion of "timely
notice" of such covert operations to the intelligence oversight committees of Congress, without
legislating any precise number of hours or days, is the proper procedure.
215. See War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 270. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
asserted that "there is not a Congress that could resist" a Presidential request to "have an up or
down vote" within as few as "the next 10 days." Id.
216. President Ford's "State of the World" Message of April 10, 1975, urged Congress to clarify
several restrictions placed on U.S. military activities so that he could evacuate Americans, their
dependents and South Vietnamese "whose lives may be endangered should the worst come to pass."
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lines were collapsing all around the invaded country. With this emergency at
hand, Congress stalled and never approved the President's request. Weeks after
delivering his message, while Congress was still debating the issue, President Ford
took matters in his own hands. He announced to the nation that the Indochina
evacuation was completed on his own authority. 2 7 This sorry event in our recent
history stands as proof enough of the Legislature's hesitance to respond timely
to a Presidential request for legislative concurrence in even the most demanding
of circumstances.
Returning to the practical question of how matters might be improved without
requiring that either Congress or the White House yield its basic constitutional
claims, it is suggested that the answer may lie in the thoughtful legislation
introduced by a broadly bipartisan group of Senators, including the current
Majority Leader, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Armed
Services Committee and other legislative leaders. The primary sponsor is Senator
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), the former Senate Majority Leader. This measure, S.J.
Res. 323 of the 100th Congress, 28 would correct many of the most glaring defects
in the 1973 statute. In pertinent part, the measure provides:
(1) Troops would no longer be subject to being automatically pulled out
of a crisis area in sixty days if Congress fails to act on legislation authorizing
the President's action. The arbitrary time limit for mandatory withdrawal would
be repealed, thereby removing one of the major legal defects of the statute.
21 9
The automatic "no-House" veto of the War Powers Resolution, under which
not even a single House need vote to halt a Presidential action, is more seriously
flawed under the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses 2" of the
Constitution than the "one-House" legislative veto struck down by the Supreme
Court in Chadha." 'l
(2) Congress could no longer use a simple concurrent resolution to order a
halt to the deployment or engagement of U.S. forces abroad. Instead the
Legislature would have to use a joint resolution which is, of course, subject to
Presidential veto. 2 2
(3) Congress will identify with whom the President is to consult. Instead
of contacting 535 members of Congress every time an emergency or vital national
security issue arises, he would be called on to consult with a group as small as
six members and never larger than eighteen. The consultative body will be a
permanent joint Senate-House group which should mean that only one consul-
tation is mandated at a time, not multiple sessions with the two Houses and a
multitude of different committees. 22
3
CQ ALMANAc 1975, supra note 33, at 306-309. He did not submit a formal § 4(1) report pursuant
to the War Powers Resolution, but his public request constituted an appeal for the kind of "specific
statutory authorization" contemplated by the legislation.
217. President Ford's evacuation statement of April 29, 1975. Id. at 314.
218. See the text of S.J. Res. 323 reprinted in War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at
346-362. The legislation was reintroduced as S. 2, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 167 (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1989).
219. S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CoNo. REc. 6239 § 4(a) (1988).
220. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3.
221. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-951 (1983).
222. S.J. Res. 323, § 4(b)(l)-(2).
223. S.J. Res. 323 § 3(b)(1)(A), 3(c)(1) (as amended).
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Students of history may find the proposed panel comparable to the original
Senate created by the Framers, which had twenty-two members and (at least in
concept) was small enough for intimate consultation but not too numerous to
safely trust with state secrets. It is true that George Washington did not find
that body helpful in his one meeting in person with the Senate regarding Indian
treaties, 22 but in our modern age of nuclear weapons, chemical warfare, terrorism,
and drug cartels, a national unity of purpose on vital foreign policy decisions is
more essential than ever to the survival of the nation. Therefore, it may be
constructive to experiment with a special consultative group of this nature in the
search for a new partnership among the political branches with respect to national
ends and strategy regarding the most important national security matters.
It is true that contacting legislators at a moment of extreme emergency may
leave them little to do but support the country in time of grave threat. Even so,
the practice will bring members of Congress into the decision-making arena from
that time forward. It gives the President a glimpse into what the range of
legislative opinion will be regarding the steps he is proposing (or is committed)
to take. And, it is at least mindful of the role the legislative branch may have
to play at some future date in sustaining the nation's policy course over an
extended period.
In this manner, the Bush Administration has effectively managed several
military crises while building and keeping the domestic political support necessary
to uphold its goals. Within three hours of receiving a request from Philippine
President Corazon Aquino for military assistance during a coup attempt in
December 1989, Vice President Quayle had telephoned House Speaker Thomas
S. Foley (D-Wash.) and Senate majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine)
to advise them of the President's decision to act in support of Mrs. Aquino's
government. White House legislative liason Fred McClure and his staff telephoned
several other congressional leaders within the first hours after the crisis broke.M
During the much larger Panama intervention, President Bush himself con-
tacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress shortly before ordering the assault
on General Noriega's headquarters. The next morning, the President told the
American people about the invasion and why he had directed it. 226 Bush also
personally called Speaker Foley and Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-
Kan.) immediately upon ordering U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi
Arabia on August 3, 1 9 9 0 .
22
7 National Security Adviser Brant Scowcroft tele-
phoned Senator Mitchell, and the Democratic and Republican leaders of the
House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees were also informed
promptly of the decision.28 Bush subsequently tried to build on the early support
given for his policy by holding several press conferences and making televised
speeches to the nation explaining his view of the vital interests at stake. 229 For
example, he met with Congress in both open and executive sessions on August
224. See A. SOFAER, supra note 1, at 95-96 (discussion of Washington's ordeal in the Senate
Chamber).
225. Chronology of a Crisis, Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1989, at Al5, col. 6.
226. Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at A38, col. 1, 2.
227. Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1990, at A18, col. 6.
228. Id.
229. Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
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28, 1990, to present a formal report to the lawmakers and spoke to the American
people in a primetime address before Congress on September 11, 1990, again
discussing the military deployments and his objectives in the Persian Gulf.
Although his written reports to Congress were submitted as being "consistent
with" rather than "required by" the War Powers Resolution, 230 strong bipartisan
support was given for actions he had taken to date and the lawmakers seemed
to feel President Bush had gone far enough in consulting (or informing) them. 231
Thus, the practice used by the Bush Administration bears out the prudence of
institutionalizing such a process of crisis consultation as a standard method of
behavior. This is in recognition of the fact that the road to national unity
concerning military decisions is more a political task than it is a constitutional
problem. Indeed, former Under Secretary of State, Eugene V. Rostow, has stated
that consultation "is not a term of any fixed constitutional meaning. "232 Instead
it is "a matter of political intuition and of discretion. '233 The response to
Rostow's insight is that any legislated system of consultation should be cooperative
in form and not inhibitive. In other words, as Rostow writes, a statute "should
never deny the President his inherent power to make his own choices about
whom to consult and when.''234 Arranged in a system which not only allows the
President to consult whomever and whenever he decides, but in addition, calls
on him to meet or talk with at least a small number of identified Congressional
Party and Committee leaders, consultation would provide the opportunity to
initiate a dialogue and foster trust. Moreover, consultation would lay the ground-
work for shared responsibility that could solidify the President's policy over the
long haul, when matters may become more difficult. It may be true that such a
legislated consultative process is an extra-constitutional scheme. Nevertheless, it
is a pragmatic one in line with traditional American notions about greater
deliberation leading to more reasoned decisions.
CONCLUSION
In answer to the questions raised at the outset of this article, the President
can unilaterally initiate self-defense actions to protect the safety of U.S. citizens,
230. Whatever the actual risks of war - and military officers in the field were openly concerned
about the safety of the first, thinly deployed troops arriving in Saudi Arabia - the Presidential
statement sent to Congress on August 10 denied that hostilities were imminent. 48 CoNG. Q. 2598-
2599 (Aug. 11, 1990). If the War Powers Resolution is to be so easily evaded by the simple use of
clever wording, then it is an embarrassment to the legislature (as a sign of its unenforceability) and
would be better dropped from the statute books.
231. Democrats Pledge Strong Support for President's Policy, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1990,
at A35, col. 5; Bush Wins Support on Hill, Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1990, at Al, col. 5. All 100
Senators signed a letter to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington supporting President Bush's
stance on economic sanctions against Iraq. Financial Times (London), Aug. 6, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
In early October 1990, the House of Representatives and Senate each approved by overwhelming
margins legislative resolutions supporting President Bush's actions in response to Iraqi aggression and
to protect American lives and vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. Although neither measure
achieved final passage in both chambers, the resolutions expressed the collective judgment of Congress
in affirmation of Bush's deployment of U.S. armed forces in the region and the maintenance of
credible deterrent military force to achieve U.S. objectives in the Gulf. H.R.J. Res. 658, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. H8441-8442, H8549 (daily ed. Oct. 1,1990) (380 votes to 29); S. Con. Res.
147, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S14338 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (96 votes to 3).
232. Remarks of Eugene V. Rostow at American Enterprise Institute Conference of April 1988,
reprinted in THE FErERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 67, at 43.
233. Id.
234. Letter from Eugene V. Rostow to J. Terry Emerson (Aug. 12, 1987).
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U.S. property, or the fundamental rights of the nation. This includes cooperating
in regional self-defense actions, whether in Central America or the Persian Gulf,
vital to the national security interests of the United States. In the case of Iraq's
aggression in the Middle East, the interests of protecting the U.S. citizens against
terrorism, the stability of worldwide economies, the freedom of shipping in
international sea lanes, and the avoidance of escalating this limited conflict into
a larger religious or cultural war, are all involved as considerations supporting
the President's discretion.
The President, however, cannot start offensive war. To use a scenario
suggested by Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the President would clearly be
engaged in an unconstitutional war of aggression if he attempted to hold onto
Clark Air Field and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines by force after failing to
negotiate a satisfactory new base agreement, regardless of the strategic importance
of those bases to our Pacific Basin strategy. 23 On the other hand, the President
can ignore a declaration of war or veto it (and ignore the veto override),
236 just
as he can refuse to ratify a treaty by failing to exchange the instruments of
ratification with another government, even after the Senate has given its advice
and consent to that treaty.
237
The President can also ignore funding restrictions on his deployment of
military units in particular regions of the world and he does not have to comply
with Congress's command about what weapons systems or strategy he is to
employ in any given hostile action. Congress's appropriations power is subservient
to the separation of powers doctrine. 238 It is true the Legislature could recklessly
235. See War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 309. The need for an immediate reaction
to foreign events without awaiting a declaration of war or prior legislative review is illustrated in
President George Bush's prompt decision to comply with the request for military assistance made by
Philippine President Corazon Aquino during a revolt against her government in late 1989. If Bush
had failed to instruct U.S. F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers to provide tactical air cover ("an aggressive
cap") over two Philippine air bases held by rebels, the Aquino government might not have survived
until Congress could meet or be consulted.
The air cover mission included the "explicit" warning to the rebels that their planes "would be
shot down." In addition, the F-4 pilots accompanied Philippine jets during strikes at a rebel base.
If the coup attempt had succeeded, the matter of our continued presence at six U.S. military bases
in the Philippines may have arisen sooner than anyone, even Senator Biden, had anticipated.
Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1989, at A4, col.
2.
236. Senator Brock Adams (D-Wash.) equated a declaration of war to the Congress' plenary
power of impeachment, which the President cannot veto. War Powers After 200 Years, supra note
56, at 109. The two Houses of Congress, however, act on impeachment cases as prosecutor and
court. Impeachment is a trial, not a legislative proceeding. Congress is conferred with plenary power
over interstate commerce, yet the President can veto a legislative measure passed under the Commerce
Clause. Or, he can veto an appropriations bill even though Congress has plenary power to make
appropriations.
237. A treaty enters into force for the United States only when the President "has ratified it or
otherwise given official notification of assent to it .... " RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312 comment j (1987). "Once the Senate has consented,
the President is free to make (or not to make) the treaty and the Senate has no further authority in
respect of it." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AsuAiMs AND THE CONsTrrTON 136 (1975).
238. Recent U.S. military actions in the Middle East have raised serious peripheral questions
concerning the use of nonappropriated funds, assassination attempts and foreign basing. Specifically:
(1) The Bush Administration asked Congress (unsuccessfully) for sweeping power to use gifts, monies,
services and property contributed by foreign governments to defray U.S. military costs "as the
Secretary of Defense deems appropriate" and without further Congressional approval or regulation;
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disband the four military services by failing to appropriate any defense funds
and leaving the nation's safety to the militia. If it can do the greater, why not
the lesser? The answer is because congressional policy restraints invade the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief and bearer of the executive power of
national self-defense. Congress cannot increase its own powers at the expense of
the executive branch. Also, we can conclude that Congress cannot be counted
on to vote expeditiously if a president would simply say, "I am submitting a
report under the War Powers Resolution and I want you to have that vote within
the next ten days." '239 Neither House in Congress voted up or down on President
Ford's request for legislative participation in his decision to evacuate American
citizens and South Vietnamese nationals from Saigon in 1975.
This leaves us with the fundamental question asked by historian Richard J.
Barnet in his introduction to The Rocket's Red Glare: "If the President need
not consult either the people or their representatives on such life-and-death
decisions for the nation, what role is left for the people in setting the nation's
course?" u Barnet answers his own question at the conclusion of his book by
stating: "Presidents now wield life-and-death power over every citizen, but they
feel compelled to make ever greater efforts to court public opinion because the
consent of the governed has been withdrawn from time to time in dramatic and
unprecedented ways. '" 241 Barnet points to practical limits on military adventures
in Central America and real nuclear arms reduction proposals by the Reagan
Administration as examples of policy changes forced by popular opinion.
242
My own response to his question is that any president who invokes his
discretionary power to use force in active defense of national interests, without
congressional participation in his decision, or who goes further to actually thwart
the expressed will of Congress, is risking the collapse of his political program
and the ruin of his party, if not the sanction of impeachment. The Vietnam War
itself is an example of how the force of a free media and public opinion worked
to end the spiral of escalation of America's military role in Indochina. When
the clear majority of the American people stopped backing the war, we withdrew
(2) The House voted for a conditional troop pullout from Japan in reaction to the view widely held
in Congress that wealthy Japan's support of our Gulf operations was insufficient, thus presenting
the issue of who may make the decision of stationing troops in a foreign land thousands of miles
from an ongoing crisis zone; and (3) The disclosure of U.S. air strike planning against Iraq highlighted
the issue of targeting a foreign leader (Saddam Hussein) for possible assassination, contrary to past
Presidential policy accords with Congress.
Under my suggested model of the separation of powers, these are political issues requiring
political, not judicial, resolution. As a practical matter, the decisions will likely be worked out in
concert among the two branches, but viewed as a pure constitutional issue, they are left in the first
instance for the President to act on as he finds necessary for the national defense, subject to the
several political sanctions (including impeachment) discussed in the text.
239. War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 56, at 270 (paraphrasing the testimony of Senator
Biden). Congress did approve authority for the use of military force to carry out 12 U.N. Security
Council Resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but the vote was close and is no guarantee
that a constitutional stalement will not occur in the future. H.R.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Pub. L. No. 102-1 (approved Jan. 12, 1991).
240. R. BARNET, n RocxTs' RED GLARE: WHEN AmlCA GoEs To WAR: PRESIDENTS AND THE
PEOPLE 13 (1990).
241. Id. at 399.
242. Id. at 399.
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from it. All the while, the political process continued to function and survived
uninterrupted during a major war. The outcome of that process overruled the
judgment of the President and ended the war.
In sum, the U.S. constitutional system satisfies the needs of national military
security and domestic liberty in a democracy. The problem of a Vietnam War
or Nicaraguan mining does not call for legislative impediments on the President's
constitutional role, but rather improved political leadership, a human trait evolv-
ing from the American election system and society itself, not from a defect in
the separation of powers.
4 3
243. The Persian Gulf crisis, in late-1990, illustrates that there are at least four separate situations,
other than the classic example of repelling an attack, in which the President may commit troops
without a declaration of war: (i) to protect U.S. citizens held as hostages or otherwise in immediate
danger of harm; (ii) to protect property held by the U.S. or Americans abroad; (iii) to protect the
vital economic, political or other strategic interests of the U.S. directly threatened by illegal aggression
of a foreign power; and (iv) to enforce the international obligations of the U.S., including U.N.
Resolutions.
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244. Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm on Jan. 16, 1991.
1990]
(Desert Shield) (over 400,000 troops)2"
(U.S. troops suppressed rebellion)
(230 Marines, rescue mission)
(24,500 combat forces; 23 killed)
(F-4 Phantom jets combat air patrol)
(2 MIG-24s shot down)
(27 warships, 85 escort operations)
(bombing strikes by F-11 & Navy attack
aircraft)
(three harbors mined by Presidential
order)
(3,000 combat troops)
(8 F-i 5s, AWACs, ground logistic forces)







(evacuation of U.S. nationals)
(evacuation of U.S. nationals)
(evacuation mission)
(Sixth Fleet deployment)
(150 man task force)
(21,500 troops)
(540,000 troops; 56,000 deaths)
(100 airlift personnel, 68 military advisers)
(180 ships, 24 troop-carrier squadrons)
(5,000 Marines)




(480,000 U.S. forces; 33,647 deaths)

